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THESIS

ROMANIA'S EXPERIENCES WITH DEFENSE REFORM SINCE THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION AND THE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS VIEWED AS A TRINITY

by

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March 2007

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SINCE THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION AND THE DIMENSIONS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS VIEWED AS A TRINITY**

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Ramona Stan
Romanian Ministry of Defense

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure (U.S.)
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CADA	Action Committee for Democratization of the Army
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSAT	Supreme Council of National Defense (*Consiliul Suprem de Aparare a Tarii*, Romanian abbreviation)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Armed Forces
DoD	Department of Defense (U.S.)
EU	European Union
GAO	General Accounting Office (U.S.)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MoD	Ministry of Defense (Romania)
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officers
PAP-DIB	Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building
PAP-T	Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism
PARP	Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PGs	Partnership Goals
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SIGMA	Support for Improvement in Government and Management
SSR	Security Sector Reform

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I.   INTRODUCTION

A.   PURPOSE

The thesis addresses Romania's civil-military experiences with defense reform since the collapse of communism in December 1989. It draws on the record of the Romanian Ministry of Defense and the armed forces in the planning and implementation of defense reform in the recent past. Its focus is on civilian democratic control over the Armed Forces, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness.[1]

The questions that the thesis seeks to answer are: Could we draw on specific qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the progress of defense reform and the transformation of civil-military relations? What are the key achievements and failures registered by the Romanian authorities in designing and implementing successive generations of defense reform throughout sixteen years of consolidating democracy and enforcing healthy civil-military relations? Was there a certain logic in establishing different priorities for Romania's defense reform (i.e., enforcing civilian control over the armed forces was the primary objective during the early 1990s, while increasing efficiency and effectiveness reached the agenda only during the latter stages of defense reform)? These measures of success will be applied to the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS); human resources management; and the modernization of military equipment – the three fields of defense policy seen as essential for a comprehensive assessment of progress alongside the civil-military relations trinity.

This thesis will examine Romanian defense reform both sequentially and thematically. First, the sequential dimension examines the various phases, or

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[1] This is a framework suggested in Bruneau, Thomas and Harold Trinkunas, "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization* Vol. 13, Nr. 5 (December 2006), 776-90. Borrowing from the well-known "Trinity" of Clausewitz, they posit these three aspects as a "trinity" of civil-military relations.

"generations," seen in the evolution of Romanian defense reform:[2] a) the first generation lasted between December 1989 and the NATO Summit held in Madrid in 1997; b) the second generation occurred between 1997 and Romania's accession to NATO; and c) the last generation is still on-going. This approach has been employed by such donor agencies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the early stages of Romanian administrative reforms. This periodization also helps to track the commitment of Romanian political and military authorities to meeting the interoperability criteria for NATO integration in 2004, and subsequently to the European Union (EU), of which Romania became a full member state in January 2007.

In the second instance, thematically this thesis examines early efforts to re-establish the rule of law and the legitimacy of state institutions, and to enforce democracy and sustainable development. Reform of Romania's defense also sought to redefine the roles and missions of the armed forces to make them compatible with democratic institutions. Establishing civilian democratic control over the military required the government to govern effectively with democratic transparency and accountability.[3] This goal required democratic oversight over defense planning and budgeting, and the re-professionalization of the armed forces. All these goals emerged as important objectives of Romanian defense reform during the early 1990s. The second and third generations of defense reform lasted from 1998 until Romania's accession to NATO in April 2004. This period witnessed more specific reforms that focused on defense efficiency and military effectiveness. The success of these reforms can be measured by progress in the defense planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS); the human resources management system; and the modernization of military equipment.

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[2] Chris Smith uses the concept of "first and second *generation of conditionality*" (*Conflict and Security Development.* 1(1)/2001). The concept of "generations of reforms" has been used as such in the work of many scholars researching defense reform in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. George C. Maior and Sebastian Huluban, "From Hardware to Software Reforms in Romania's Civil-Military Relations. The Policies of Personnel Management," *Baltic Defence Review* No. 8. Vol. 2/2002. Ionel Nicu Sava, *Western (NATO/PfP) Assistance to Build Democratic Civil-Military Relations in South Eastern Europe. The case of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.* Final Report, the Manfred Wörner Fellowship 2001-2002, Bucharest, November 2002), Timothy Edmunds, "NATO and its New Members," *Survival* 45, no. 3 (2003).

[3] Civilian democratic control over the armed forces is the first and most "privileged" dimension of the civil-military trinity, according to Bruneau and Trinkunas (Op. cit., 778).

B. IMPORTANCE

The importance of the research operates on the theoretical and the practical levels. The theoretical approach proposed by the thesis attempts to identify relevant indicators for measuring progress with respect to each of the dimensions of the civil-military relations trinity. It addresses the developments with defense reform through the lenses of civilian control over the armed forces, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness. On the practical level, this thesis draws on the lessons learned during successive generations of reform in Romania. This analysis provides a context and a guide to dealing with challenges posed by ever shrinking defense budgets, as in today's Romania. The policy recommendations that conclude the thesis may prove extremely valuable for politicians involved in making decisions regarding defense budgeting, policy-makers, and the civil servants and officers who must implement the decisions made regarding the management of defense resources. Finding appropriate strategies to increase defense efficiency and military effectiveness always brings about the necessity of strategic planning and careful spending of defense resources (people, money, and equipment). This applies equally when setting the agenda for future defense reform and when addressing the inherent challenges posed by the defense reform' implementation phase.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The conceptual framework proposed by the thesis builds on the topical approach suggested by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas in their recent work on the civil-military relations trinity in consolidating democracies.[4] Such themes take into account classical theories about civilian control of the military, re-shaping the roles and missions of the armed forces in a democracy, the professionalization of the armed forces and an all-volunteer force. But modern approaches to performance management at the level of defense bureaucracy, efficiency in procurement decision-making and contracting, and the "civilianization" of the military institution are also to be addressed, given the identified indicators for measuring progress in civil-military relations. In the process, it builds

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[4] Bruneau and Trinkunas, Ibid.

primarily on the contributions of scholars from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).[5]

The thesis also reviews the concepts of the classical theory on civil-military relations and such related themes as civilian democratic control over the armed forces forces, and military professionalism, as introduced by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.[6] Some of the issues addressed in conjunction with democratic civilian control over the military, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness touch upon the structural model introduced by Michael Desch,[7] or the "post-modern" military approach embraced by liberal democracies of the West. This approach recommends a paradigm of "all all-volunteer forces, smaller armed formations, flexible, fully interoperable, highly mobile and state-of-the-art equipped," as argued by Charles Moskos, believed by some scholars to be one of the most influential military sociologists of the last decade.[8]

Taking into account that, in general, "defense reforms are intended to bring about changes in the military establishment, to achieve greater oversight and control, greater effectiveness and/or greater efficiencies in spending" as pointed out by Bruneau and Trinkunas in the introductory chapter of a forthcoming book,[9] the thesis starts with some conceptual clarifications of "defense reform," but also with some working definitions of "defense efficiency" and "military effectiveness." These are the two dimensions of the

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[5] Most important and recently published is: Bruneau, Thomas and Scott D. Tollefson, eds. *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations.* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006). Also important is the recent work of scholars from DCAF: Born, Hans, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhlmann, eds. *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change.* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[6] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relation* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). The theme is revisited by Huntington decades later – "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy* 6(4)/1995, 9-17. See also: Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1960) and Peter Feaver, "The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23(2) (1996), 149-78.

[7] Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

[8] Ionel Nicu Sava, *"Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Eastern Europe"*, Research paper, G-125, Conflict Studies Research Centre. (Surrey, England: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2003), 9-10.

[9] Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas. *"Global Trends and their impact on Civil-Military Relations,"* draft chapter of a forthcoming book. Material provided by the author.

civil-military trinity that are usually neglected by such research. Thus, the first section of the thesis builds on the research of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF),[10] and on the contribution of Peter Drucker to the science of management and organizational analysis.[11] The theoretical debate cannot ignore the issue of efficiency in defense procurement and contracting,[12] as embraced by the military bureaucracy, or the incentives proposed to cost-savings in the case of the concept of an all-volunteer force,[13] as opposed to the conscription armies. More managerial-like approaches to performance management are suggested by on-going research conducted at the level of different branches of the United States Armed Forces.[14]

A recent study dedicated to intelligence reforms, democracy, and effectiveness by Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau was also insightful with regards to the attempt to identify possible indicators associated to the civil-military relations trinity in a democratic regime. In this respect, the three questions that the authors recommend to be answered (which are also consistent with the present analysis) are as follows: "1) Do electorally and constitutionally accountable civilian officials control the military? 2) Do they handle it in such a way that it can be effective at achieving its roles and missions from war fighting and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or emergency-response work? 3)

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[10] A series of working papers, occasional papers or proceedings of international workshops organized by DCAF were published by authors such as Theodor Winkler – *Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order*, DCAF Occasional Paper No. 1 (October 2002). See also Marina Caparini, *The Relevance of Democratic Control of the Security Sector*. DCAF Working Paper Series, Geneva: DCAF No. 24 (July 2002).

[11] Using the definitions proposed by Peter Drucker (*People and Performance: The Best of Peter Drucker on Management*. (New York: Harper's College Press, 1977: 33), according to whom "Efficiency is concerned with doing things right." while "effectiveness is doing the right things," one can assert that achieving the military effectiveness depends on the established Objective Force, the forces deployed in theatre, or the professionalization of the Armed Forces, while on the other hand, defense efficiency is achieved by generating a given output using fewer resources (i.e., people, money, equipment).

[12] For relevant debates during the 1960s see Frederick T. Moore, "Efficiency and Public Policy in Defense Procurement", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Government Contracts: Part I, (Winter, 1964), 3-18.

[13] William P. Snyder, and Peter Davis, "Efficiency and Usefulness in Policy Research: the Case of All-Volunteer Force", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Jan.-Feb., 1981), 34-46.

[14] The United States Navy, *Navy Performance Excellence Guidebook*, 2006, http://usn.hq.navy.mil/SeaEnterprise, (accessed August 12, 2006).

Is all this being accomplished with maximum efficiency?"[15] Given the above, the proposed analysis takes into account the objectives of defense reform at different stages, the constitutional and legislative changes to put them into place, and the structural arrangements and defense policies drafted by the Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to enforce them. Other authors like Richard Kohn and Michael Desch argue that the challenges of civilian democratic control are ultimately tested by "whether civilians can exercise supremacy in military policy and decision-making,"[16] an issue that leads to a more delicate problem, namely the competence and experience of civilian leaders or the kind of control mechanisms civilians are likely to adopt.

To conclude, some ingredients that enable civilian control over the military, which are also relevant for the thesis, are as follows: the existence of democratic governance and the rule of law, civil liberty, a stable method for peaceful succession in power, workable practices for electing officials, accountability to public institutions, effective countervailing power and a military tradition committed to neutrality.[17]

After establishing the conceptual framework for analyzing defense reform and the dimensions of civil-military relations, the first part of the thesis proposes a set of relevant indicators for each of the elements of the trinity.

The following section of the thesis builds on some of the most relevant legacies of communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which explain the common challenges and patterns of development in regards to defense reform and civil-military relations in the aftermath of the Cold War. This section provides a critical

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[15] Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, "Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness," *Journal of Democracy,* National Endowment for Democracy and The John Hopkins University Press, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 2006), 31.

[16] Richard Kohn. *An essay on Civilian Control of the Military,* http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html. (accessed January, 2006). See also Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military,* 2001, 5.

[17] Many of these indicators were addressed by Professor Edwin Micewski, *NS3025 – Introduction to Civil-Military Relations*, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, NSA Department, Course notes, (Winter 2006). See also Kohn (1997), 145-46.

analysis of the defense reform reviews and scholarly materials published by professionals employed by NATO advisory groups[18] or by the staff of the DCAF.[19]

The third section provides a potential framework for net assessment of Romania's approach to defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution. Building on the approach of political and military authorities to issues that pertain to civil-military relations, the thesis draws extensively on the contribution of Romanian decision-makers involved in establishing and implementing the defense reform objectives, policies and strategies.[20] The work of Larry Watts on the issue has also been extremely valuable, given the experience and perspective of the author, who had the chance to be both an observer and a contributor to Romania's reforms in defense and security.[21] To better understand the progress of defense reform, but also the developments in civil-military relations registered by the Romanian Ministry of Defense, a more detailed, field-related analysis is provided. It will account of major accomplishments, but also failures that occurred in various areas of defense policy (the PPBS, human resources management, and the modernization of equipment). Scholarly articles published by Romanian policy-makers, but also strategy papers issued by expert structures of the Romanian MoD provided resourceful insights in accomplishing this task. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the chapter on the professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces

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[18] See, for instance, the individual or group contributions of authors such as Chris Donnely, Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, many of them published in *NATO Review* and other relevant publications on defense and security analyses. A thorough analysis is also proposed by Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk, "Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July 1997 Summit," *Strategic Forum,* National Defense University, No. 101 (Feb. 1997), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF101/forum101.html (accessed Dec. 12, 2006).

[19] Anthony Forster, T. Edmunds, and A. Cottey, *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe. Building Professional Armed Forces.* (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2002). Forster, Antony. *New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agendas.* DCAF Working Paper Series, No. 83, (Geneva: DCAF, August 2002). Fred Schreier and M. Caparini. *Privatizing Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies,* DCAF Organizational Paper no. 6 (Geneva: DCAF, March 2005).

[20] See the collection of materials published by DCAF: *Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. Romania – A Self-Assessment Study.* (Geneva: DCAF, 2003).

[21] Serving as a security sector reform consultant to the Romanian Presidency under many administrations, Larry Watts is the champion of the Romanian defense reform reviews, as addressed by the international political and military community.

published by Marian Zulean in a book edited by Forster et al.[22] An article published by the same author in the spring of 2004 provides a fair overview of the constitutional and legal provisions regarding the Romanian military organization in the semi-presidential regime,[23] and also a key indicator of civilian control of the armed forces. The work of George Cristian Maior[24] and Mihaela Matei also proved to be of great value. Building on the paradigm of civil-military relations, the authors observe that while "defense planning in military establishment… evolved toward an artificial separation of civilian and military responsibilities," the joint civil-military efforts to establish the first two National Security Strategies (issued in 2001 and 2004) and two White Papers of Security and National Defense argue for "extended limits of civilian expertise in order to address areas considered exclusively military."[25]

The above lead us to a comprehensive analysis that is not exclusively dedicated to civilian control, but also to the other two dimensions of civil-military relations, defense efficiency and military effectiveness.

D.   METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Given the argument of the thesis and the research questions, the case study (on Romania's defense reform) and the comparative analysis (among countries in the CEE region) are the essential methods to be used. On the other hand, policy analysis and policy recommendations would prevail in the attempt to review the developments registered in the three areas of expertise (the PPBS, human resource management system, and the modernization of equipment and procurement reform).

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[22] Marian Zulean, "Professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces," in Forster et al. *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe* (Basinstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2002).

[23] See M. Zulean "Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe." *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Spring 2004), 62-3.

[24] George Cristian Maior was the State Secretary for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department (2000-2004). A diplomat by profession, Maior was appointed a Senator for the Social-Democrats, and as of late 2006, he was appointed in as Director of the Romanian Intelligence Agency.

[25] George Maior and Mihaela Matei. "Bridging the Gap in Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe: Romania's Defense-Planning Case," *Mediterranean Quarterly,* (Spring 2003): 65, 73.

To a large extent, both the comparative analysis and the case study build on a variety of primary and secondary sources to present the cases and support the hypothesis. These include a critical analysis of constitutional and legal provisions, policy and strategy papers elaborated by various expert structures of the Romanian Ministry of Defense, and also selected interviews and press conferences conducted by former and current decision-makers, namely political figures or military experts.

Building on the proposed conceptual framework and the evidence regarding Romania's progress against qualitative and quantitative indicators of the civil-military trinity, the analysis provides an aggregate assessment of the research findings relative to major achievements and failures alongside the three selected fields of activity chosen for revisiting the defense reform. Using a one-to-five assessment scale (1 being the minimum, and 5 representing the maximum), the thesis concludes with an evaluation that attempts to correlate the founding principles of democratic civilian control, military effectiveness, and defense efficiency – on the one hand – with the progress registered by the Romanian MoD in particular fields of defense reform – on the other hand.

E.   ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Four major sections comprise the thesis. After the introductory chapter, the first part of the thesis is devoted to conceptual clarifications and drawing a framework of analysis. Several approaches to 'defense reform' versus 'defense transformation,' as well as current debates on defining the dimensions of the civil-military relations trinity (civilian control over the military, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness) will be considered. This approach will help us to identify key qualitative and quantitative indicators for measuring progress with defense reform and civil-military relations. These indicators will constitute the framework for analysis for further review of progresses registered in civil-military relations by countries of Central and Eastern Europe, while special attention will be paid to the Romanian case study.

The following section proposes a comparative analysis of the state of affairs in civil-military relations as encountered by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during communism, with a focus on the last years, and the period since the historic

changes of 1989. Understandably, special attention will be given to characteristics that are specific to the Romanian case in this respect.

Then, the study builds on more detailed analysis of Romania's experiences with defense reform throughout sixteen years of consolidating democracy. It takes account of the objectives, strategies, and policies designed to reach the national priorities, as well as the outcomes of defense reform initiatives alongside three generations of defense reform. The role played by various internal and external actors in pursuing defense reform and enhancing civil-military relations will be underlined throughout the proposed analysis. A sub-section of the thesis applies the proposed sets of indicators for the civil-military relations trinity, to field-related progress in the following areas of defense policy: the PPBS, human resources management, and the modernization of military equipment and defense procurement.

The thesis concludes by providing an overall assessment of the achievements made by the Romanian MoD in addressing the civil-military relations trinity and the attached set of indicators regarding various elements of the approach (civilian control over the military, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness). Building on the above, some policy recommendations for further improvement of the civil-military trinity will finalize the proposed analysis. They should be valid not only for the Romanian political and military authorities, but also for other decision-makers, policy-designers, and scholars investigating relevant indicators for civilian control, defense efficiency, and military effectiveness in both consolidating and long-established democracies.

II. DEFENSE REFORM AND THE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS VIEWED AS A TRINITY: SEARCHING FOR INDICATORS

A. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

There is no clear-cut distinction between defense reform, military transformation and the modernization of the armed forces. In the majority of cases, both colloquially and in the scholarly literature, and not only when it comes to the defense and security sector, the terms are used interchangeably. Equally, civil-military relations are sometimes seen as being synonymous with democratic civilian control of the military, ignoring the other two dimensions that a thorough analysis of the trinity presupposes. However, as this section will demonstrate, a sizable difference exists among these concepts, and this difference refers to the nature and the degree of change and innovation involved in each of the above. Underlining the conceptual differences proves essential for the goal of the research, namely measuring progress of Romania's defense reform, with particular attention to civil-military relations. That is because identifying relevant indicators to evaluate civilian democratic control, defense efficiency and military effectiveness are pivotal for the purpose of the thesis, namely to create a framework for analysis of civil-military relations. It will also prove essential for the assessment of Romania's defense reform throughout the transition to democracy, and will contribute to further research regarding improvements on each of the dimensions of civil-military relations.

1. 'Defense Reform' *Versus* 'Defense Transformation'

When it comes to the applicability of such terms as 'reform', 'transformation' and 'modernization' to national defense and security, the debate is open to addressing complex issues like downsizing and restructuring of the defense bureaucracy; changing the military doctrine and defense policy – reflected in the national security strategy, in most cases; or introducing innovations in military technology, such as the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which has become popular in recent years.

Nevertheless, differences among countries and their military power are visible when comparing the magnitude of transformational processes and the ways in which they pursue changes, and how the various stages are reached, in terms of civil-military relations. The Western democracies took the lead in establishing the standards of defense reform initiatives and transformation processes, and this trend became apparent especially since the end of World War II. Not surprisingly, beyond the ups and downs registered in respect to civil-military relations, the United States was the champion of defense transformation and successes registered in implementing ambitious defense reform initiatives, many of them with a view to improving performance in defense management. That is because consolidated democracies enjoy a rich and relatively long history in terms of democratic civil-military relations, but also because they possess the economic means to implement the ambitious and costly objectives of defense reform initiatives, many of them requiring military transformation and a culture of innovation. But what exactly does "military transformation"– a term that entered into common use in the late 1990s – mean, and how does it differ from "defense reform"? Are there differences between the objectives or the degree of change between the two concepts? And if the answer is yes, which term would better describe the progress made by the young democracies of CEE, and especially by Romania? Let us first proceed with some functional definitions.

A recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report on the United States' defense transformation defines the concept of 'defense transformation' as a "largescale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization that are prompted by significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different international security challenges."[26]

Reviewing some of the key attempts in the American military literature to define the concept of 'transformation,' which refers primarily to technological advance, the RMA, or "making the U.S. military forces more expeditionary," Ronald O'Rourke, the

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[26] Ronald O'Rourke, *Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Updated January 23, 2007, p. 2. (This is the most recent version of the CRS Report on the issue).

author of the CRS Report stresses the fact that all these attempts are, in fact, just some descriptions of the transformation strategy, or "prescriptions for how the United Stated military forces should be transformed."[27]

To return to the functional definition proposed, it is essential to illustrate the understanding that lies behind the American concept of 'defense transformation.' Thus, some of the essential shifts that are envisioned by the U.S. Department of Defense and reflect the departmental view on the objectives of 'defense transformation' can be summarized as follows: "From a peacetime tempo – to a wartime sense of urgency; from single-focused threats – to multiple, complex challenges; …from under-resourced, standby forces (hollow units) – to fully-equipped and fully-manned forces (combat ready units) etc.," as O'Rourke illustrates.[28] In other words, the nature, efficiency and the tempo of the changes are addressed at highest standards when it comes to the defense transformation process.

The author of the CRS Report recognizes the difficulties that occur in any attempt to calculate the potential cost of defense transformation. As such rationales refer to the "cost" element, which is essential in measuring defense efficiency and military effectiveness, such motives are also relevant for our attempt to identify key indicators of civil-military relations and progress with defense reform. According to O'Rourke, among the motives that justify the difficulty in measuring the costs of defense transformation, the following are listed:

> a) opinions differ on what kinds of planned changes for DoD qualify as transformational, and which do not; b) developing and acquiring new weapons and equipment … can be very expensive, but the cost of this can be offset, perhaps substantially or even completely, by reducing or canceling the development and procurement of non-transformational weapons and equipment that would no longer be needed; ...c) implementing transformational changes in an organization can also cost

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[27] Ronald O'Rourke, *Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Updated January 23, 2007, p. 2. (This is the most recent version of the CRS Report on the issue). 3.

[28] Ibid., 6-7. To support his argument, the author cites the Report on the *2005 Quadrennial Review*, submitted to the U.S. Congress on February 6, 2006.

money, but these costs might similarly be offset by the reduced recurring cost of maintaining the new forms of organization; etc…[29]

Building on an article by Geoff Fein published in Defense Daily in January 2006,[30] O'Rourke concludes that "Instilling a culture of innovation among DoD personnel will be critical to implementing transformation."[31] This will be one of the features to be observed by the political and military stakeholders involved in managing defense reform during the latter stages of Romania's defense reform, when introducing innovations became affordable.

But when addressing the dramatic changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s, the term 'defense reform' or the broader concept of 'security sector reform'[32] (SSR) appears to be preferred, as a review of literature demonstrates. However, there are authors that choose the term 'transformation' to emphasize the magnitude of shifts and innovations done by the armed forces, although the issues covered by their academic debate are the same. Thus, among the themes discussed are the following: a) the new operational concepts; b) military capabilities; c) defense resource management, including human resources management; d) the concept of Objective Force; and e) the equipment modernization program.[33]

A comprehensive spectrum of issues covered by defense reform is provided in the introductory section of a report entitled "Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status and Challenges," which was elaborated by a group of authors from the U.S. General

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[29] Ibid., 11.

[30] Geoff Fein, "Intellectual, Cultural Change Needed for Transformation, Official Says," *Defense Daily* (January 24, 2006).

[31] O'Rourke, *Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,* CRS Report for Congress (Updated 23 January 2007), 22.

[32] See Theodore Winkler, "Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order," *Occassional Paper* No. 1, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (October 2002). A more detailed analysis to SSR, is provided by Born, Fluri, and Lunn (Eds.), *Oversight and Guidance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its reform. A Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector,* (Brussels/Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2003).

[33] Although the issues covered are similar, there are equally American scholars, as well as Europeans (e.g. Chris Donnelly's work dedicated to analyzing 'defense transformation' in CEE). One of the Romanian scholars who use the concept of 'defense transformation' to emphasize the dramatic changes operated by the institution is Cornel Pavel (*Romanian Armed Forces Transformation*, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlistle Barracks, PA, 2002).

Accounting Office (GAO) in April 1999. As emphasized by the report, the four major pillars around which any debate on the defense reform initiative is built, which also mirror Romania's priorities for reforms through successive generations of reforms are as follows: a) reengineering defense business and support functions, primarily by adopting and applying the private sector's best practices; b) reorganizing and reducing the size of DoD headquarters elements and defense agencies; c) expanding the use of competitive sourcing to open DoD's commercial activities to competition from the private sector; and d) conducting two additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds and eliminating other facilities that are no longer needed and/or drain resources." [34]

In his work dedicated to security sector reform, Ambassador Theodor Winkler, the director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) defines the 'security sector reform' (SSR) as a 'constant challenge,' a process that consists of five elements, which are further addressed.

> First, the reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to democratic principles and the needs of state and society. Secondly, the starting point is a broad view of the term "security," including military, societal, economic and environmental security risks. Thirdly, the reforms include all services: military, police, intelligence agencies, state security, paramilitary organizations, and border guards. Fourthly, security sector reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous process; it is not a goal in itself, but aims at providing security both to the state and to its citizens. Fifthly, the reforms concern both the organization of the security sector (legal framework, structure of institutions, division of labor) and the human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating services staffed with professionals.[35]

Winkler draws on the application of the conceptual framework adjacent to security sector reform in context of strategic shifts in the Euro-Atlantic region. Building on the experiences of joint military- and development-related programs funded by the

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[34] See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), *Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status, and Challenges*, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. (Washington, D.C. Washington, April 1999), p. 2. A thorough analysis to competition among suppliers in important high-technology markets, including software development, communications, aeronautics, and defense is proposed by Tracy R. Lewis and Huseyin Yildirim, "Managing Dynamic Competition," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 92, No. 4. (Sep., 2002), 779-97.

[35] Theodor Winkler, *Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security Sector and International Order,* Occasional Paper no. 1, Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Armed Forces (October 2002), 10-1.

United States and Germany, but also on the positive results supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom, Winkler asserts that "linking security sector reform and development cooperation into a joint strategic approach," may prove a very resourceful experience.[36]

As we can see, all the above objectives of defense reform are intended to reduce costs and improve the performance of the defense apparatus, primarily through adopting a managerial-like approach to defense management. Although at a different scale, given the starting point and the scope of defense reform in Romania, these will be the indicators used by the further assessment of the progress registered by the national political and military authorities while implementing defense reform.

In the new political, social, economic and administrative context, re-establishing the authority of the state apparatus raised serious concerns for the Western community, especially when it came to security and defense organizations, perceived as instruments of power by the former dictators.

Caught in the midst of historical transformations to ensure the transition to democracy, good governance and sustainable development, the Romanian military organization was facing dramatic changes. These changes regarded the roles and missions the armed forces were called to perform in the new, democratic regime. The relationship between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the society at large, with political leaders and population in particular, as well as the institutional capacity to respond to the new challenges were also among the key objectives at stake for the defense reform.

Defense reform was part and parcel of the complex challenges facing the transitional democracies of CEE, including Romania. Such challenges included the overall restructuring of public administration, the legislative framework to shape the new roles and missions of the state institutions. Thus, downsizing and restructuring of the military organization, the professionalization of the armed forces, or the implementation of basic democratic principles such as civilian control over the armed forces, transparency and accountability were only a few of the objectives of the overarching priorities of the transition process.

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[36] Ibid., 39.

That is because "In general, defense reform is intended to bring about changes in the military establishment, to achieve greater oversight and control, greater effectiveness and/or greater efficiencies in spending," as pointed out by Bruneau and Trinkunas in the introductory chapter of a forthcoming book.[37]

2. Defining the Elements of CMR and Identifying Indicators for Analysis

The success of defense reform in the field of democratic civil-military relations – but also regarding the overall changes that are envisioned in the field of security and defense, one could argue – can be easily understood as a dependent variable that can be challenged by each of the elements of civil-military relations trinity, as proposed by Bruneau and Trinkunas.[38] This brings us to another inter-connected theme regarding the shift in thinking imposed by the recent approach to good governance and new institutionalism by the end of the 1990s, where the attention moved from military spending to decision-making processes involved in the 'guns and butter' dilemma, as argued by Jeanne Giraldo in a recent book dedicated to contemporary approaches to civil-military relations.[39]

The difficulty in distinguishing among measures to improve civilian democratic control over the armed forces, or to reach certain levels of efficiency and effectiveness in a military bureaucracy is, by definition, an ambitious task and a debatable issue, irrespective of the democratic history of a given country.

When it comes to the young democracies of CEE, where the legacies of communist regimes challenged the fundamental nature of state institutions and their legitimacy, the task of analyzing successes and failures registered by security and defense reform is even more complicated. This is because isolating the specific evidence of the objectives, resources, and strategies embraced to reach the priorities involved in this

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[37] Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas. "Global Trends and their impact on Civil-Military Relations," draft chapter of unpublished book (2007). Material provided by the author.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Jeanne Giraldo, "Chapter 7 - Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective Governance", In: *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*. (Eds.) T. Bruneau and S. Tollefson. 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006).

equation may prove to be a difficult endeavor, if applied to defense reform and civil-military relations, as the experience of young democracies of CEE demonstrates. However, beyond its complexity, such an approach is a must, when analyzing the progress of defense reform, and the issues of civilian democratic control, efficiency and effectiveness, as it helps us better understand the historical developments seen in the field of defense reform, given the specific circumstances and priorities, as well as to draw some lessons learned from this painful process.

If the theme of "civilian democratic control over the armed forces," seen through the lenses of classical approaches proposed by Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz is not a novelty among scholars, the same can not be said about the notions of "security and defense efficiency" and "military effectiveness," the other two pillars of the trinity guiding the research.

a.   *Civilian Democratic Control over the Armed Forces*

Establishing democratic institutions to enforce civilian democratic control over the armed forces is nevertheless the first and clearly most "privileged"[40] dimension of the civil-military relations trinity to be analyzed, especially when it comes to the defense reform of the transition democracies of CEE in the aftermath of the Cold War.

But a clear distinction between "democratic" and "civilian" control over the armed forces does not exist. Furthermore, subjective control over the military may have its benefits in certain phases of establishment and consolidation of the new democracies in Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s, as Barany observes when comparing the parliamentary *versus* presidential regimes embraced by the countries in the region during the specified period of time. As the author observes, there

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[40] T. Bruneau and H. Trinkunas, "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization*, Vol. 13, No. 5 (December 2006), 778.

are characteristics that indicate rather subjective civilian control over the military, which signify the "maximization of civilian influence and then reduction of the officers' sphere of autonomous decision-making."[41]

As argued by Richard H. Kohn, "the paradox of Huntington's formulation is that the greater a military's autonomy, the less control civilians actually exercise; while 'objective' civilian control might minimize military involvement in politics, it also decreases civilian control over military affairs."[42]

On the other hand, for many scholars civilian control is often seen as a prerequisite feature of a stable, liberal democracy, and our argument would build on this approach. Paraphrasing Huntington's writings in *The Soldier and the State*, Kohn summarizes the civilian control ideal as "the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority."[43]

Another attempt to differentiate between the "democratic" and "civil" control belongs to Larry Watts, an author that brings us closer to Romania's specificity, the case study for further focus in the thesis. Watts refers to the democratic control seen as "that control exercised by elected representatives of the people principally, but not only, through the legislature."[44] Thus, as the author concludes, democratic control should be the orienting benchmark of civil-military reform, as inclusiveness and transparency are among its determining elements.

According to Kohn, there are two challenges that civilian control presents nowadays, depending on the level of maturity of the democracy. First, as the author has put it, for mature democracies, "the test is whether civilians can exercise supremacy in

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[41] Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Oct., 1997), 29.

[42] Richard H. Kohn is a professor of history and chairman of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as well as Executive Secretary of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. See R. Kohn, *An essay on Civilian Control of the Military*, 1997, electronic resource, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html, (accessed March 2, 2006).

[43] R. Kohn, *An essay on Civilian Control of the Military*, 1997.

[44] Larry Watts, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control". *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002): 61-63.

military policy and decision-making."[45] Second, the challenges facing the newly-emerging democracies are much more profound, as they relate to establishing civilian control while preventing political involvements at the level of the military, or even more, to prevent possible military overthrow.

Michael Desch argues that the level of civilian control is determined by "whether or not civilians prevail in disagreements with the military."[46] Especially this definition opens room to address the issue close to our view on the problem, namely the competence and experience of civilian leaders, or the kind of control mechanisms civilians are likely to adopt.

Taking the above into account, a few ingredients to enable civilian control relate to democratic governance and rule of law, civil liberty, a stable method for peaceful succession in power, workable practices for electing officials, accountability to public institutions, effective countervailing power and a military tradition committed to neutrality.[47] If the last requirements are not necessarily strengths of CEE countries, the first should make the difference.

Building on the characteristics of what he coined "objective civilian control," Huntington underlines, in an article of 1995, the complex challenges in which civil-military relations developed at the beginning of the 1990s in former authoritarian regimes in different regions of the world, including the CEE and Latin American countries. After taking into account major shifts facing the newly emerged democracies in terms of political, economic, and social changes, the author explains why civil-military relations are "a dramatic exception to the lackluster performance of democracies in so many other areas." The conclusion he draws in this respect is that the overall assessment of the state of civil-military relations is a positive one, in comparison with how the emerging democracies have dealt with other problems, as follows: "The new democracies

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[45] R. Kohn, Ibid..

[46] Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 5.

[47] Edwin Micewski, *NS3025 – Introduction to Civil-Military Relations*, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, NSA Department, Course notes, (Winter 2006). See also Richard Kohn (1997), 145-46.

have been more successful in dealing with CMR than in most of other major challenges they face. Sustaining that success now depends on their ability to make progress in dealing with the ills that lie outside their militaries and within their societies at large."[48]

However, the establishment of a constitutional framework to allow the formation of the defense commissions to oversee military expenditures or major procurement programs is not an end in itself, neither is it the only indicator of democratic civilian control over defense and security issues.

The so-called "civilianization" of the defense department also has its own advantages in terms of defense efficiency, as we shall see. This is because, "Unless a sufficient cadre of well-prepared experts is available to advise political leaders on military questions, civilian control will remain little more than a charade,"[49] as pointed out by Bruneau and Tollefson in the concluding chapter of their book of 2006.

In their recent study dedicated to intelligence reforms, democracy and effectiveness, Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau argue that the three relevant questions to be answered regarding the civil-military relations in a democratic regime (which are also consistent with the present analysis) are as follows: "1) Do electorally and constitutionally accountable civilian officials control the military? 2) Do they handle it in such a way that it can be effective at achieving its roles and missions from war fighting and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or emergency-response work? 3) Is all this being accomplished with maximum efficiency?"[50] Under these circumstances, the levels of analysis proposed by the thesis gain substance and appear relevant, as it takes into

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[48] Samuel Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy*, Baltimore, Vol. 6, Issue 4 (Oct. 1995), 9-17.

[49] Bruneau and Tollefson (Eds.) *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*. 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 265.

[50] Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, "Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness". *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 17, No. 3, National Endowment for Democracy and the John Hopkins University Press (July 2006), 31.

account the objectives of defense reform at different stages, the constitutional and legislative changes to put them into place, or the structural arrangements and policies to enforce them.[51]

But some of the impediments to intelligence reform, as proposed by the two authors, are equally valid in the case of defense reform. Thus, significant overlaps may be noticed in the case of politicians' limited knowledge on security and defense matters, as a key reason for their lack of enthusiasm and superficiality in controlling and ensuring civilian oversight over defense spending, but also to the relative "freedom from budgetary, legal, and other restrictions" that the security and defense enjoyed during communism, a privilege they naturally want to preserve.[52]

If applied to the Romanian Ministry of Defense, the above can be translated into the higher degree of secrecy existing during the early stages of defense reform regarding the concrete manning, allocation of financial resources, or even the real pay scale of active militaries. This was because of the lack of information (a database to aggregate all the data was absent) rather than the defense officials' efforts to conceal this information. However, there are still many questions that are unanswered, with regards to some controversial acquisition contracts or the attributes and outcomes of military intelligence, the latter being somehow reasonable in certain limits.

Furthermore, the imperatives proposed by Boraz and Bruneau to advance democratic control over the intelligence community, its transparency and its effectiveness, are also transferable to the defense reform, as they consist of issues such as: raising public interest and pressure, increasing civilian awareness and competence,

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[51] These criteria and inquiries build on the criteria established by the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, then promoted through the means of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), that was set up in 1997. Among the founding principles of the EAPC there are the following "expanding contacts between NATO and Partners and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation". (See "Chapter 2 – New Institutions," *NATO Handbook*, Ed. 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020202.htm, accessed March 7, 2007).

[52] S. Boraz and T. Bruneau, "Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness". *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 17, No. 3, National Endowment for Democracy and the John Hopkins University Press (July 2006), 32-4.

institutionalizing periodical assessments on how the roles and missions are accomplished, fostering trust and credibility, or professionalization.[53]

In an attempt to conceptualize civil-military relations in the contemporary world, a book recently published by Hans Born et al. argues that the issue is concerned in a broad sense with the social relations between the military and society, while in a narrow sense regards the political relations between civilian governments and the military, viewed through the lens of basic principles as follows: openness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy and pluralism. Accordingly, democratic civilian control of the armed forces is about good governance, defined by the authors as "effective, honest, equitable, inclusive, transparent and accountable and consistent with the rule of law."[54]

That is because, as the analysis demonstrates, the essence of defense reform had to address both political and military measures of success, and both quantitative and qualitative progress. As Simon and Binnendijk have put it in their assessment of 1997:

> In addition to active participation in PfP, new members would have to ensure that adequate resources are available to assume the added and considerable financial obligations of joining, and to develop necessary interoperability-to include: (1) defense management reforms in areas such as transparent defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation, and parliamentary and public accountability; and (2) minimal standards in collective defense planning to pave the way for more detailed operational planning with the Alliance.[55]

All the above introduce the necessity of addressing the conceptual framework for understanding the other two elements of civil-military relations, namely defense efficiency and military effectiveness.

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[53] Ibid., 35-7.

[54] Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jurgen Kuhlmann. *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5-6.

[55] Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk: "Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July 1997 Summit," *Strategic Forum,* National Defense University, Number 101 (Feb. 1997), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF101/forum101.html (accessed December 12, 2006).

b.   *Defense Efficiency*

Focusing on military effectiveness and defense efficiency might prove one of the most ambitious tasks of an approach to democratic civil-military relations and the developments in the implementation of defense initiatives. That is because distinguishing between the terms of 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness,' as proposed by the classics in the theory of management is not an easy task in itself. Furthermore, when it comes to their applicability to defense and security, the characteristics attached are even more blurred.

The issue presents its challenges even for long-established democracies, that have the experience of public scrutiny over military budgeting and defense spending, and where the fundamental democratic principles (such as the rule of law, accountability, transparency and efficiency)[56] have ceased to be simple theoretical desires addressing the governmental agencies empowered with legitimate means to provide security and defense to citizens. The question of measuring efficiency and effectiveness to see how successful the defense and security reforms are in the new democracies of Latin America or Central and South-Eastern Europe or to improve them is nevertheless an extremely difficult task. However, such an approach would be worth the effort, as it provides us with the comprehensive understanding of the defense reform strategies and the value-added by the institutional changes that many of the transitional democracies of CEE embarked upon sixteen years ago.

According to scholarly dictionaries, the concept of 'efficiency' is associated with "the effective operation as measured by a comparison of production with cost (time, money, human resources)," while 'efficient' suggests "an acting or a potential for action or use in such a way as to avoid loss or waste."[57]

Going further, the approaches to the terms proposed by the classics of management theory distinguish between "effectiveness" and "efficiency" as follows:

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[56] Larry Watts adds 'inclusiveness' to these basic principles of good governance. (See L. Watts, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control." *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002), 63.

[57] *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 11th Ed, Encyclopedia Britannica, (Merriam-Webster: Springfield, 2004), 397.

Using the definitions proposed by Peter Drucker, according to whom "Efficiency is concerned with doing things right. Effectiveness is doing the right things,"[58] one can assert that a major element distinguishing the two is that 'effectiveness' means "capability of producing an effect," and paying attention exclusively to setting objectives, while efficiency brings about the costs involved to achieving those goals. *Mutatis mutandis,* achieving the military effectiveness may be interpreted as and depends on the established Objective Force, the forces deployed in theatre, or the professionalization of the armed forces, while on the other hand, defense efficiency is achieved by using fewer resources – e.g. people, money, equipment – to generate a given output.

For the reader of the federal page of *The Washington Post*, Bradley Graham is a well-known name, as the journalist published a series of important articles regarding how the defense business is managed by defense and security institutions and officials in the United States. For instance, in 1997, the journalist discussed the initiative of then Defense Secretary William S. Cohen to establish an independent panel (Task Force for Defense Reform), in an attempt to reduce overhead and streamline business practices. Buying more off-the-shelf technology and computerizing operations is only one of the examples of the successful initiatives already used by the Pentagon to improve efficiency. Borrowing from the objectives of the panel, there are three ways that are envisioned to improve efficiency and wring savings from defense agencies, as follows: "reducing the staff, eliminating duplications, and saving more money in a host of agencies and departmental field activities."[59]

As underlined by Paul Kaminski, former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), it is a truism that competition brings incentives for organizations to improve quality and reduce costs. Thus, it appears that "competition increases efficiency" and that it is the competition itself, and not the outsourcing – as

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[58] Peter Drucker. *People and Performance: The Best of Peter Drucker on Management* (New York: Harper's College Press, 1977), 33.

[59] Bradley Graham, "Defense Efficiency," *The Washington Post*, Washington D.C., May 15, (1997), A.21.

commonly believed – that "drives the best value."[60] To clarify the issue, the author goes further and stresses out the key conditions to be fulfilled if activities are to be outsourced, as follows: a) if in-house performance of that activity is not required to meet mission requirements; b) if a competitive commercial market exists for that activity; and c) if outsourcing the activity results in the best value for the government.[61] In his view, the rationales of outsourcing go beyond the attainment of objectives related to cost savings, but also to the more profound transformation of the defense bureaucracy and performance improvement:

> If done correctly, outsourcing will not only save us money, it will help us build the kind of organization we want DoD to be: an organization that thrives on competition, innovation, responsiveness to changing needs, efficiency and reliability.[62]

Another important reference regards the results-oriented management. Building on Newcomer's definitions of results-oriented or performance-based management,[63] in an article published in 2005, Sharon Caudle argues that "Results management relies in large part on defining the mission, key actors who must deliver it, and principles guiding choices about results that should be achieved." [64] The author critically analyses several approaches for homeland security results management, among which risk management, balanced scorecard, and capabilities-based planning and assessment. She underlines that each of these approaches can "(a) define the goal of the homeland security mission, (b) establish the level of results to be achieved, (c) identify

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[60] Paul Kaminski, *Defense Efficiencies and Outsourcing,* Technical Reports, Concluding Remarks of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) at the Association of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Privatization and Outsourcing Symposium, (Crystal Gateway Marriott, Arlington, VA Washington D.C. April 24, 1997), 3.

[61] Ibid., 4.

[62] Paul Kaminski, *Defense Efficiencies and Outsourcing,* Technical Reports, Concluding Remarks of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) at the Association of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Privatization and Outsourcing Symposium, (Crystal Gateway Marriott, Arlington, VA Washington D.C. April 24, 1997), 6.

[63] K. Newcomer, E.T. Jennings, C. Broom, and A. Lomax (Eds.), *Meeting the challenges of performance-oriented government* (Washington, DC: American Society for Public Administration/Center for Accountability and Performance. 2002), 14.

[64] Sharon, Caudle, "Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management", Public Performance & Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, (March 2005), 353.

investments necessary to achieve the planned results, and (d) provide a way to measure progress," and concludes that future research is needed in order to select the best of these approaches.[65]

In order to identify concrete indicators of progress with defense efficiency, most authors measure it by addressing decisions in defense procurement, contracting out, managing defense industry, or the question of the professionalization of the armed forces, including the "civilianization, as all the above refer to the cost element and how resources are spent to accomplish objectives, and implement defense policies. Understandably, the Western democracies, and especially the United States, where founders of the science of management were born, dedicated their academic work to finding ways to improve defense efficiency and effectiveness since the 1960s.[66]

In an article published in *Law and Contemporary Problems* in 1964, Frederick Moore raised important questions regarding efficiency in procurement, given the fact that "Procurement and contracting by the Department of Defense with U.S. industry amounts to almost half of the total defense budget."[67] As the author put it, "since the price-cost comparison is inconclusive, the criteria for efficiency in defense procurement must rest on the degree of progressiveness and innovation and on the level of profits; yet even these criteria are obscured by the government's role in the internal management of the programs."[68] As underlined in the concluding section of the article, no one would quarrel that competitive bidding results in favorable cost-price relationships, although this procedure has limited applicability in the procurement of

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[65] Ibid., 373.

[66] See, for instance Frederick C. Mosher, "Old Concepts and New Problems," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3. (Summer, 1958), 169-75. Other scholars who address the issue are R. Bar-Yosef and E. O. Schild, "Pressures and Defenses in Bureaucratic Roles," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 71, No. 6. (May, 1966), 665-73.

[67] Frederick Moore, "Efficiency and Public Policy in Defense Procurement", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Government Contracts: Part I, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter, 1964), 3.

[68] Ibid., 14.

major weapons systems.[69] More recent sources dedicated to the issue of efficiency in defense procurement after the Cold War focus on the issue of contracting.[70]

But increasing defense efficiency is also accomplished through adequate policies and practices regarding human resources management, as a consistent part of the scholarly literature demonstrate. Part and parcel of the above is the debate on the advantages of the "civilianization" of the defense department, one of the issues that will be analyzed in section four of the thesis, when reviewing the Romanian case and some of the initiatives that are undertaken by the Romanian MoD to increase efficiency.

An important contribution to the issue was brought by the study of 1978 by Binkin, Kanter and Clark, whose attempt to evaluate efficiency relies on comparing the costs of military and civilian manpower.[71] Based on the assumption that "[personnel] ceilings encourage efficiency," the authors assert that ceilings also serve two other purposes as well, both of them visible aspects of CMR at all times: a) ceilings brake bureaucratic growth; and 2) ceilings can serve as a political instrument.[72] In chapter five of the study ("The Military-Civilian Mix") the issue of cost and effectiveness shows important evidence regarding comparing the costs of military and civilian manpower. As the authors summarize,

> In recent years, since the compatibility pay rule has been extended to military personnel, and particularly to the advent of the all-volunteer force, some analysts have come to believe that it is less costly to fill a job with a federal civilian than with a uniformed employee.[73]

Indeed, the DoD shares this view:

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[69] Ibid., 15

[70] James J. Anton, and Dennis A. Yao, "Measuring the Effectiveness of Competition in Defense Procurement: A Survey of the Empirical Literature", *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Winter, 1990), 60-79.

[71] Martin Binkin, Herschel Kanter, and Rolf Clark. *Shaping the Defense Civilian Work Force: Economics, Politics, and National Security.* Studies in Defense Policy. Vol. 19. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978).

[72] Ibid., 21.

[73] Ibid., 43.

…civilians are generally less costly than military manpower. This results primarily from the fact that military personnel generate more secondary support requirements than civilians… Further, additional backup (or pipeline) positions are included in military strength as trainees, transients, patients, and prisoners.[74]

In an attempt to check the validity of such assumption, the authors review the costs involved by employing military and civilian personnel, taking into account three categories of costs: a) compensations - which include an array of benefits, some of which are in kind, some deferred, and others conditional; b) pipeline costs – in addition to the employees on the job, the military services also maintain a pool of people to offset those absent from their jobs while undergoing training, traveling between assignments, and the like; and c) indirect support costs.[75]

One of the conclusions of the authors of the study is that "in a great majority of cases, conversions from military to white-collar civilian personnel would result in long-term budgetary savings, whose precise magnitude would depend on the nature of the billets being converted. By similar logic, the analysis suggests that the substitution of military personnel for blue-collar civilians, at current pay rates, might also lower costs."[76]

In the authors' opinion, to obtain the best balance between military personnel, civilians and contractors, the following steps should be taken:

a) a clear distinction must be drawn between jobs that, for reasons of national security, should be filled by military employees and those that can be filled by civilians; b) the conditions under which a job has to be

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[74] Ibid., 42-7. See also *The mix of the Defense Labor Office* (The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), 1976), 6.

[75] The DoD provides a variety of support services, the cost of which should be allocated to its employees: commissaries and exchanges, recreation, welfare and morale, preparing and serving food, and overhead services allocated to training activities – see Martin Binkin, Herschel Kanter, and Rolf Clark. *Shaping the Defense Civilian Work Force: Economics, Politics, and National Security.* Studies in Defense Policy. Vol. 19 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), 45-6.

[76] Binkin et al., 1978, 51.

performed by government employees must be defined; and c) all other positions should be filled by whichever type of manpower is most effective in relation to its costs.[77]

The issue is further considered by a study performed in 1998 by scholars of the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), which is published by RAND.[78] The study focuses on "civilianization" and "outsourcing" as decisive options for reducing operating costs in defense.

According to Susan Gates and Albert Robbert, "civilianization" is defined as "the transfer of functions performed by military personnel to civil service personnel,"[79] while "outsourcing" involves the "transfer of functions performed by either military or civil service personnel to the private sector."[80]

"Civilianization" is widely believed to reduce costs, because "civil service workers are assumed to be less expensive than their military counterparts," as argued by the authors of the research. Furthermore, the study encourages the DoD to use the minimum number of personnel to meet national security objectives and to use civil service personnel whenever possible. Among the difficulties acknowledged by the authors, is that to establish elements of costs other than pay (e.g. health care costs for military personnel), or the lack of data, which can bring about biased cost estimates. [81]

As the report of 1998 recalls, by reviewing some of the rationales used by the DoD Directive 1100.4, issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1954, when deciding if a position in the organizational chart of the DoD should be labeled as a 'military' job, the following conditions should be accomplished: a) that position is an essential element of combat readiness; b) that position is needed to ensure rotational

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[77] Ibid., 75-6.

[78] Susan M. Gates, Albert A. Robbert, *Comparing the Costs of DoD Military and Civil Service Personnel*. United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998).

[79] Susan M. Gates, Albert A. Robbert, *Comparing the Costs of DoD Military and Civil Service Personnel*. United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), iii.

[80] Ibid., 1.

[81] Ibid., 4.

opportunities for personnel stationed overseas; or c) the law requires that such a position to be staffed by military personnel.[82] The analysis confirms that "civilianization can produce cost savings under many, but not all, circumstances."[83]

Another issue of recent interest is that regarding the flexibility that should be allowed to military units in planning and employing the staff they need, as at that level the requirements of personnel are best known. In this respect, a study published by the RAND Corporation in 2006 suggests that: "In most cases, workforce planning should be left to local installations or other organizational units, such as commands, agencies, or functional sponsors, which may be more attuned to their specific personnel requirements than Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)."[84] In the authors' view, the only role that the OSD can play is a supportive one, consisting of coordinating efforts across installations and occupations within the Department of Defense.

However, if analyzed in connection with the principle of civilian democratic control, the idea of 'civilianizing' the defense institution captures current discourse and practices, especially for countries still searching for the most appropriate ways to enforce civilian control over the armed forces and the issues of efficiency. It is worth mentioning, in this respect the activity organized by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies organized in Yerevan, Armenia, on February 5-7, 2007. The topic of the conference was "Armenian Defense Reforms: Seminar on the Civilianization of the Ministry of Defense and Amending the Law on Defense," and among the aspects discussed were the following: How has the process of civilianization been carried out in new NATO member countries? As regards the temporary appointment

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[82] The General Accounting Office (GAO), *DoD Force Mix Issues: Converting Some Support Officer Positions to Civilian Status Could Save Money*, Washington, D.C., Letter Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-15 (October 23, 1996).

[83] Gates et al., 1998, 63.

[84] Susan M. Gates, Christine Eibner, Edward G. Keating, *Civilian Workforce Planning in the Department of Defense: Different Levels, Different Roles*, U.S. Department of Defense. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), xx-xxi.

in newly-created civilian posts of former military personnel (who benefit from early retirement packages): how was the issue addressed, especially in the new members of the North-Atlantic Alliance?[85]

As the section dedicated to the human resource management policies within the Romanian Ministry of Defense will demonstrate, these bring about one of the most controversial, though most clear-cut principles pursued by the defense bureaucracy to increase efficiency.

c. *Military Effectiveness*

A recent and inspiring approach to 'military effectiveness' belongs to Ferenc Molnar, according to whom, "The measure of [military] effectiveness is most likely a properly financed, socially accepted and capable military, which requires balanced civil-military relations in a consolidated democracy."[86]

Scholars like Suzanne Nielsen argue that there is a significant difference in approach between Huntington and Janowitz as regards the causal relationship between civil-military relations and military effectiveness. Thereby, while Huntington discusses "military effectiveness as a product of civil-military relations," Janowitz "does not entirely separate professionalism and effectiveness," which bring about three major challenges (such as "defining and operationalizing military effectiveness," "defining civil-military relations," and decoding the "effectiveness – or rather efficiency, one could say – of a military organization"), as Nielsen argues.[87]

In 1999, two years after his article on the Pentagon's initiatives to improve efficiency was published, Bradley Graham revisited the issue of civil-military relations,

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[85] The agenda and presentations of the Conference organized in Yerevan, Armenia, on February 5-7, 2007 is available on-line on the website of George C. Marshall Centre, http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-conf-index-1/xdocs/conf/conferences-current/static/xdocs/conf/static/2007-conferences/20070205-0710-index.html. (accessed March 10, 2007).

[86] Ferencz Molnar, "Civil-military relations in Hungary. From competition to co-operation" in: Hans Born et al. *Civil-Military Relations in Europe. Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 114.

[87] Suzanne Nielsen. "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," *Public Administration and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2005), 66-7.

this time with a focus on military effectiveness. Following the findings of a study run by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, a research group in Durham, North Carolina,[88] Graham observes that "elite military officers have largely abandoned political neutrality." In the journalist's opinion, this brought about distrust in civil-military relations: "During the 1990s, the principle of civilian control has been subjected to more ongoing strain than at any time in American History." As mentioned in the study, "Our research identified numerous schisms and trends that have undermined civil-military cooperation and, in certain circumstances, could degrade military effectiveness." Related to that, a distinct correlation between the number of veterans in politics and the use of force in American power politics has been observed since 1816: "The more veterans in the national political elite, the less likely the United States was to initiate the use of force."[89] Examples of current politicians who were former prominent members of the military corps of professionals abound in Romanian politics.

In a conference paper presented for a workshop organized in 2002 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), François Godet, a legal adviser of DCAF proposed a comprehensive list of normative elements of civil-military relations that could be laid down in the Constitution, or in secondary legislation (laws, presidential decrees, governmental decisions etc.). Covering all the dimensions of the trinity, some of the elements that fall into the first category – civilian control – are as follows: a) mission of the armed forces, b) principle of subordination of the armed forces to the civil authority, c) political neutrality of the armed forces, d) competency for deploying the armed forces in the defense of national territory or within the framework of an alliance, e) competency for declaring war, and f) principle of conscripting armed forces.[90] According to the author, among the more detailed legal provisions that could be

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[88] One of the members of the project is Peter Feaver, professor at Duke University and a prominent figure among scholars on civil-military relations.

[89] Bradley Graham, "Civilians, Military Seen Growing apart; Study finds Partisan Armed Forces 'Elite'", *The Washington Post*, Washington D.C., (October 18, 1999), A.17.

[90] François Godet, *The Pyramid of Norms in the Security Sector*, Conference Paper prepared for the Workshop "Legal Issues and Practices in the Field of Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Security Sector: National and International Perspectives" held on 5-6 April, 2002 in Geneva, DCAF, Switzerland, (Geneva, DCAF, 2002), 2-4.

laid down in laws and governmental decisions, the following are included: a) prohibition of partisan activities in military barracks, b) designation of high-ranking generals, c) professional status of military personnel, d) assistance to professional conversion after completion of assignment, etc.[91]

Taking into account all the above, there are authors who consider that 'democratic civil-military relations' is synonymous with "effective democratic management of the security sector and of the related government agencies and hence effective participation in NATO."[92]

As the following chapters demonstrate, throughout generations of defense reform, Romania made consistent progress in establishing such a legal framework, to enforce healthy civil-military relations and implement the principles of democratic oversight, transparency and accountability which are usually associated with such a normative framework.

B.   CONCLUSION

As the section demonstrates, identifying appropriate indicators for healthy civil-military relations is not an easy task. There are two sets of rationales that can explain this difficulty. First, there are some indicators which are rather qualitative in nature, which makes their measurement rather complicated. This applies especially in the case of civilian democratic control, where the existence of constitutional and legal arrangements or the creation of institutional frameworks does not necessarily guarantee the appropriate implementation of the existing legislation and the actual exercise of civilian control, through the means available to democratic societies: the elected representatives, parliamentary defense commissions, media and citizens. Second, even if the elements of civil-military relations that are addressed are quantifiable in nature, which is the case of defense efficiency and military effectiveness, the opinions regarding "what should constitute adequate measurements" vary substantially. Furthermore, most of the

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[91] Ibid., 10.

[92] Ionel Nicu Sava, *Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Eastern Europe.* (Surrey, England: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2003), 3-4.

assumptions made on efficiency in procurement, civilianization of the defense ministries, contracting out and privatization could be biased, as there are always hidden costs which make cost-related comparisons almost impossible. However, to summarize the above, in searching for indicators of healthy civil-military relations, one could build on a net assessment framework that takes account of progress with defense reform on the following coordinates.

First, in terms of civilian control over the armed forces, the aspects that should be analyzed are as follows: a) constitutional and legal framework (its existence and enforcement), b) institutional arrangements and roles and missions of the parties involved in all stages of defense management, c) the information flow and communication among institutions, and d) the balanced mix of military personnel and civilian appointees in key decision-making positions regarding the defense.

Second, some of the indicators to be considered when analyzing defense efficiency are those that indicate the best value of public money and cost savings: a) the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS), b) organizational restructuring and the "civilianization" of defense institution, c) defense contracting and procurement, and d) performance management. How these developed throughout the defense reform process upon which the Romanian armed forces embarked since the December 1989 Revolution will be analyzed in the fourth chapter.

Third, among the indicators of military effectiveness, the third element of civil-military relations, the following appear to be of utmost importance: a) the professionalization of the armed forces, b) the transformation strategy that is designed and put in place by the defense institutions, c) innovation, and d) force projection.

To conclude, both defense reform, and the elements of the civil-military relations trinity recommend a systematic approach to the context in which defense reform occurs, the objectives and effective allocation of resources (that can be further detailed as human capital, Objective Force, structures, money, and equipment), as well as to the policies and strategies employed to reach desired defense reform outcomes. As noted by many authors, if the analysis of civilian control enjoys a great attention from academics, being

primarily descriptive and presupposing qualitative interpretations, deciphering successes and failures regarding military effectiveness and defense efficiency is not an easy task. It involves complex analyses of the defense bureaucracy, involving both qualitative and quantitative judgments, which can constitute reasons for which such an approach was not a common one among scholars.[93]

Given the above, the assessment template proposed for analyzing Romania's progress with defense reform, with a focus on civilian democratic control, military effectiveness and defense efficiency will focus on a small number of levels of analysis, such as objectives and policies, key structures and their functioning, constitutional and legal framework, and the specific challenges encountered when implementing defense reform. The analysis will bring about concrete progress and failures of the Romanian military organization in accommodating the new roles and missions assigned to the armed forces in a democracy, the painful measures attached to the MoD reorganization and restructuring, and defense planning and budgetary control. Even more ambitious objectives, such as those regarding the full professionalization of the armed forces, or the challenges facing civilian and military authorities when dealing with defense procurement issues, privatization of military industry and contracting out may also be addressed.

But what were the specific circumstances in which defense reform occurred in CEE countries and in Romania specifically? What was the state of social, political, judicial and military affairs inherited after decades of communism? In order to better understand the progress registered throughout the last sixteen years of defense reform and the challenges regarding CMR in the CEE countries, with particular emphasis to Romania, a brief return to the legacies of communism appears to be relevant.

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[93] T. Bruneau and H. Trinkunas. "Democratization as a Global Phenomenon and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations," draft chapter of unpublished book (2007). See also: Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau. "Reforming Intelligence. Democracy and Effectiveness". *Journal of Democracy.* Vol. 17, No. 3, (July 2006), 31. Suzanne C. Nielsen. "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," *Public Administration and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2005), 61-84.

III. THE LEGACIES OF COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE; ROMANIA'S BEQUEST

A. CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE; ROMANIA'S SPECIFICITY

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) found themselves caught in the midst of social, political, and economic turmoil. Re-building the state's authority, re-installing the rule of law, and re-capacitating institutions to perform their functions in the new, democratic and market-type environment were only a few of the issues on the agenda of the new democratic regime. These were essential in the transition towards the institutional internalization of basic democratic principles such as good governance, and sustainable development. Reiterating a paradigm proposed a few years earlier by Elster,[94] Hermann Hesse uses the metaphor of "rebuilding the boat in the open sea,"[95] to synthesize the common interests regarding NATO and European Union (EU) membership and universal difficulties to overcome them by the majority of Visegrad[96] and SIGMA[97] countries during the early 1990s.

The military organization and the armed forces of young democracies of CEE, including Romania, were in the midst of all these challenges. Furthermore, one can easily say that the progress seen regarding the implementation of defense reform and improving civil-military relations were probably the most remarkable shifts, despite the numerous competing priorities, and scarce resources available to implement the radical ideological, political and military changes suggested by the Western actors.

Building on the legacies of former communist regimes in CEE is yet one of the preferred themes of almost every scholar who attempts to address the always

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[94] John Elster. "Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea," *Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

[95] Hermann Hesse, in: Jan-Erik Lane. *Public Sector Reform. Rationale, Trends, and Problems.* (London, Sage Publications, 1997), 122.

[96] The group of Visegrad countries consisted of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

[97] SIGMA [Support for Improvement in Government and Management] is a joint initiative of the OECD and the EU, principally financed by the EU. www.oecd.org/gov/sigma, (accessed August 30, 2006).

controversial issue of democratic civil-military relations. Unfortunately, the majority of the material written on the topic is rather descriptive than explanatory. Even fewer scholars attempt to provide appropriate recommendations on how to improve the various aspects involved by the CMR.

Nevertheless, there are not many studies to capture the changes that occurred in institutional capacity, the dramatic shifts seen at the level of military doctrine and the roles and missions of the armed forces, and re-structuring the armed forces to respond to the new risks and threats, although all of the above were part and parcel of the broader social and economic reforms. Although they were at a different stage of complexity, if compared with the magnitude of the defense reform initiatives that where implemented in the modern armies throughout the 1980s,[98] the standards for defense reform in CEE during the early 1990s were almost indiscriminately established by Western democracies.

But a few questions should be addressed in this respect: Were these reform initiatives, and the external pressures to pursue them adequately tailored, in order to answer the specific needs of the young democracies that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War era? Were the objectives of defense reform and the strategies to reach them truly appropriate to the situation that existed and the ambitious targets of the former Warsaw Pact member states, with their supra-dimensional armies and the scarce resources to be allocated to defense in the new geo-strategic arrangements of the early 1990s?

The influx of ideas and practices regarding democratization of society, good governance, and sustainable development found a fertile terrain in the countries of CEE, as they embarked on radical transformations regarding the management of state affairs, including defense. In this respect, as noted by many authors, one of the frequent mistakes that CEE countries make when it comes to reforming the defense sector and progress

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[98] See, for instance, the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Among other things, the U.S. defense reform initiative strengthened the institutional roles played by the Joint Chief of Staff (See Clark A. Murdock, Lead Investigator, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004). Also of interest are a series of reports on the issue that were elaborated by the United States' General Accounting Office (GAO) (e.g. *Defense Reform Initiative: Organization, Status, and Challenges* (April 1999), *Defense Management: New Management Reform Program Still Evolving* (Dec. 2002).

with civil-military relations relates to the temptation to embrace ready-made Western solutions. Naturally, the lack of ownership of such reforms proved to be counterproductive, while the static approach to the phenomena limited the analysis to a limited number of static indicators, as some scholars mention.[99]

As argued by Joo, one of the important contributors to the assessment of defense reform in the countries of CEE, the majority of analyses conducted by American and NATO teams of experts advising on military reform would focus on formal, static indicators, rather than on effectiveness and performance. Thus, among the indicators that the author believes were considered important by external agents and which are also accountable for civilian control, the following are listed: the number of civilians appointed within the various defense and security agencies, the timing of these appointments, the stability of their tenure, and their impact on the civil-military relationship.[100] To accurately evaluate Romania's progress with defense reform, it is necessary to start with a brief incursion into the past.

B. REVISITING RELEVANT THEORIES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1. Huntington's Theory: The Transition from Subjective to Objective Civilian Control

The aim of this section is to describe the main differences between the state of civil-military relations as encountered by Romania during communism, with special attention to the last years, and the period since the historical changes of 1989.

Making use of Huntington's typology of civilian control, it will be asserted that the constitutional form of subjective civilian control characterized Romanian civil-military relations during the communist regime. After the 1989 Revolution, a transition from subjective civilian control to objective civilian control occurred. This was possible

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[99] Larry Watts, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control". *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002), 52. See also Joo, 1996.

[100] Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces," Chaillot Paper 23, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, (February 1996), 31, 57. www.iss-eu.org, (accessed August 13, 2006).

mainly due to major legislative changes that occurred in the defense and security milieu. Therefore, the second part focuses on the effects of the internal and external security environment on the civil-military relations making use of Desch's structural theory.

When writing on the topic of the relative power distribution between civilian groups and the military, Samuel Huntington emphasizes the dichotomy that exists between the subjective and the objective control of the military.[101] As the author argues, civilian supremacy can be obtained if the military power is reduced in comparison with civilian power. Following this logic, if civilian power is maximized, then subjective control arises. On the other hand, if the military is separated from the political sphere by making it professional, then objective control is attainable.

The subjective control, in addition to the maximization of civilian influence, infers the possibility of reducing the professionalism of armed forces. In Huntington's words, "the simplest way of minimizing military power would appear to be the maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military." Nonetheless, a muscular civilian authority controlling the armed forces and a professional officer corps could coexist.[102]

As Huntington points out, 'subjective control' may be achieved in three ways: by governmental institutions, social class, or constitutional form. Civilian control by governmental institution implies that one of the state powers (executive, judicial, legislative) attempts to maximize its control over the armed forces. Accordingly, the checks and balances between different state institutions affect the military.

Considering the Romanian case during the communist regime one could argue that a presidential control was in place. However, because the president controlled the legislative body and the judicial branch as well, there was no struggle of one state institution to increase its power vis-à-vis others. Consequently, the control of the military through governmental institutions, as defined by Huntington, could not have been obtained.

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[101] S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80.

[102] This assertion could be exemplified by recent developments in the US civil-military relations during the ongoing war in Iraq.

Subjective control through social [inter]class struggle requires at least two powerful social classes. Such control could not characterize totalitarian regimes, since both, from a theoretical and practical perspective there is only one social class. In communist Romania, however, there was not even one single political class with (relative) political power, namely the proletariat – as Marx argues – but only Ceausescu's clique, mainly consisting of his family, who ruled the country.

If subjective control of the military had existed in Romania before 1989 – the year of the revolution – then the constitutional form would be the case. Even though this type of subjective civilian control is not particular to totalitarian regimes, it represented a characteristic of communist countries. Huntington asserts that this type of control requires the politicization of the military. The politicization is possible by using political commissars in the military or other party militarized units as means of 'control of violence,' i.e., security forces directly subordinated to ministries other than defense. Specifically, in totalitarian regimes, the state would use "terror, conspiracy, surveillance and force,"[103] to control their armed forces.

All the militaries of communist states were affected to varying degrees by the politicization process, and Romania was no exception. An independent chain of command assured by 'political commissars' existed. Those officers were prepared and appointed by the Communist Party and in many cases they were the real commanding officers. Their presence and influence made it possible that a large part of military life was occupied by political activities. For instance, the Communist Party used the military forces as an instrument of socialization of the youth generation. Undoubtedly, the armed forces mirrored the state.

The process of politicization was augmented by powerful techniques of control and manipulation. The armed forces did not escape the control of the *'Securitate,'* the Romanian political police. The military corps was infiltrated with covert informers. Thus, cohesion within the military suffered. In addition, the *'Securitate'* had under its command special military forces, the top trained and equipped units. The officers of these units were the product of the Army officer schools.

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[103] S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80.

As regards the Romanian case, it is worth mentioning that during the 1960s, Nicolae Ceausescu, at that time Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces received the rank of Major-General. Also important to be mentioned here are the paramilitary units established during the communist regime (so-called "Patriotic Guards") and the participation of the active duty officers, alongside students, the agricultural activities or infrastructure projects, which all demonetized the idea of "military professionalism."[104]

However, the phenomenon of politicization, and the attached challenges involved in it in the early 1990s, during the first generations of defense reform, was not so dramatic in Romania, in comparison with other countries in the region. That was primarily because even during the communist regime, the country enjoyed a relative autonomy of the influence exercised by Moscow and Warsaw Pact arrangements.[105]

Another way of diluting the cohesion of the officer corps and the role of the professional army was the creation of 'Patriotic Guards,' paramilitary units placed under the direct control of Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee. The fact that these units consisting of factory workers, peasants and students were trained by army officers also contributed to the division of the officer corps. Consequently, all the methods, mentioned by Huntington, in which military power can be reduced, were employed by the Romanian dictator to control the armed forces.

In contrast to subjective civilian control, the 'objective control' model is based on the maximization of military professionalism, as argued by Watts:

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[104] Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces," Chaillot Paper 23, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, (February 1996), 31, 57. www.iss-eu.org, (accessed August 13, 2006).

[105] Larry L. Watts. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control". *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002).

More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between the military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps.[106]

Before December 1989 the majority of CEE countries, including Romania, were caught in the paradigm of an "authoritarian party-state system," that promoted 'subjective civilian control' over the military and a "limited professionalism," as Ionel Nicu Sava underlines, following the pivotal work of Huntington[107] and Janowitz.[108]

Through 'professionalization' of the military, objective civilian control may be achieved, under particular conditions such as sound legal provisions, strong political leadership, professional military, and supportive military culture, *inter alia*.[109] Whether these conditions were validated by the Romanian case in the aftermath of the 1989 Revolution will be further addressed below.

There are scholars who argue that during the communist period, the Romanian military was a professional army,[110] as it presented the characteristics attached to that, such as expertise, responsibility and corporateness. On the contrary, in the last years of the dictatorship, the de-professionalization of the military was accelerated through the involvement of the armed forces in agricultural work and the megalomaniac national projects such as the Danube – Black Sea Channel and the so-called House of the People.

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[106] Larry L. Watts. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control". *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002), 55.

[107] The theme is revisited by Huntington in 1995: S. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy* 6/4 (1995), 9-17.

[108] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Professional Portrait*. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960).

[109] Micewski, Edwin R. NS3025 - "Introductions to Civil-Military Relations" (PowerPoint presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February, 2006).

[110] Marian Zulean contends that "In the communist period, Romania had a relatively well-structured defense policy, with the main objective being the defense of the country's territorial borders. Having adopted a stance of military professionalism for almost two decades, excepting in the last years of Ceausescu's dictatorship, the Romanian armed forces were professional, but professional in an authoritarian manner. Some promotions were based on merit, but there were also promotions based on political or clan criteria." (See M. Zulean, *Changing Patterns of Civil-military Relations in Southeastern Europe* (*Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 15 No. 2, Spring 2004, 71).

But the argument that the military was under objective control cannot be reasonably made. Objective control presupposes that the military stay out of the political sphere that is to be an autonomous institution. This basic requirement was not accomplished in communist Romania. There were two cases of flagrant mixture between the military and the Communist Party. First, as previously mentioned, the political commissars were infiltrated in the armed forces. Second, a number of flag officers were present in the party boards. Therefore, this interconnection between the military and politics made the existence of an objective control almost impossible.

Understandably, during the Cold War era, for the majority of these states the 'post-modern' model, consisting of "all all-volunteer forces, smaller armed formations, flexible, fully interoperable, highly mobile and state-of-the-art equipped" – as described by Moskos and promoted by liberal democracies of the West – was unimaginable.[111]

Strongly related to the above, was the issue of the politicization of military structures in all CEE countries, before 1989. As argued by Andrew Cottey in Chapter I of a pivotal book on civil-military relations in post-communist Europe, published by the Geneva DCAF, "the military was highly politicized, in the sense that it was closely tied to the ruling Communist Party, and substantial efforts were made to embed communist political values and institutions within the armed forces." [112]

After 1989, the transition process to democracy brought along the transition from subjective civilian control of the military to objective control. This process was a long-lasting one, and many scholars would argue that it has not yet ended. However, the admission of Romania to the North Atlantic Organization Treaty (NATO), which implied principally the reform of armed forces and legislation regarding the security sector, could

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[111] Cited in Ionel Nicu Sava "Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Eastern Europe." G125, Conflict Studies Research Centre. (Surrey, England: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2003), 9-10.

[112] Andrew Cottey, In: *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe. Guarding the Guards. One Europe or Several?*, (Eds.) A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, and A. Forster (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001), 3.

indicate that this transitional process has in fact come to an end. Nonetheless, no one could claim that the civil-military relations in Romania have achieved an ideal stage of objective civilian control.

The transitional process from 'subjective control' to 'objective civilian control' started with the de-politicization of the military, continued with the reform of the Constitution and the legislation and reached an end by achieving an acceptable level of professionalization. The de-politicization of the armed forces occurred relatively rapidly, due to at least two reasons. First, the Communist Party disappeared immediately from the political scene and, at the same time, the military positions of political commissars were wiped out from military structures. Second, after the violent ethnic clashes that occurred in March 1990 opposing the Hungarian minority to the Romanian majority and the Romanian state, the armed forces have not been employed by the political leadership in solving internal crises.

The second step, which is instrumental to objective civilian control, was the building of sound legal provisions. The basic foundations for 'democratic civilian control' of the armed forces are rooted in the Constitution adopted in December 1991. But what does it mean 'democratic civilian control'? In the *Strategy Paper 2001-2004 (Business Plan),* the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) explains the term 'democratic' as "civilian and parliamentary control of the security sector" (including armed forces, paramilitary forces, police and other internal security structures, border guards, intelligence community).[113] On the other hand, Professor Harold Trinkunas in his book makes the distinction between Huntington's 'objective control of armed forces' and the 'democratic civilian control,' arguing that the essential component of the later is "institutionalized oversight of military activities by civilian government agencies." However, he concludes that "civilian control of the armed forces exists when elected officials or their political appointees have authority to decide the

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[113] *Strategy Paper 2001-2004 (Business Plan),* Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/dcaf_strategy_01_04.pdf, (accessed January 23, 2007).

resources, administration, and roles of the armed forces." Is this something else then making the military a "tool of the state"?[114]

The following period in Romania saw the adoption of laws and governmental decisions that regulate the foundation, organization and functioning of various military bodies, as well as Romania's international military relations and participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and peacekeeping missions. This period ended in 2003 with the revision of the Constitution, which made possible integration into both NATO and the European Union.

According to the Constitution, the armed forces, as part of the executive power, are placed under the direct control of Parliament, the President, the government, the Defense Minister – who is a civilian – and the Supreme Court of Justice. The control exercised by these authorities primarily consists of the approval by the Parliament and the government of the framework documents concerning defense activities, such as the National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, and the programs of constitution, modernization and preparation of forces, as well as the defense budget as part of the state budget. Concurrently, the empowered public authorities oversee whether resources allocated to the army are used in compliance with the approved programs, which will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter.

In addition to these public authorities that represent the classical power structures in the state, the armed forces are also subject to the direct control of the Supreme Council of National Defense (known by its Romanian abbreviation CSAT), the Constitutional Court and the Court of Audit. The Constitution gives to the President the right to act as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as well as Chairman of CSAT, so that he becomes the key player in national security matters. These prerogatives assure the necessary framework for the President to exercise a strong political leadership over the defense and security matters.

Radical changes occurred regarding the transition from the mass armies that existed during the Cold War in all the countries of the communist block to the

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[114] Harold Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 5-6.

professional armed forces. At the beginning of the 1990s, all the former Warsaw Pact countries were facing similar challenges: a massive army – which in the case of Romania numbered some 320,000 soldiers, tailored to respond to the megalomaniac ambitions attached to the military doctrine promoting the "war of the entire people,"[115] though poorly trained and equipped.[116] The fact that a clear, centralized inventory of resources available (that is people, distribution by ranks, but also equipment, infrastructure and real estate assets) has placed a heavy burden on the first years of restructuring and downsizing.

The process of professionalization started in an unpromising manner but was corrected under Western pressures to reform the armed forces in order to facilitate integration into the western military alliances. The beginning was marked by the lack of initiative of political decision-makers. This led to a reaction within the military and a group of active and reserve officers formed the basis of an atypical organization, the Action Committee for Democratization of the Army (known by its Romanian abbreviation CADA). Among the main requests of this organization, the following occupied a central place: promotion on the basis of merit and the retirement of the officers who supported the former regime. CADA could be seen as an extreme form of civilianization of the military, therefore it didn't enjoy a prolonged existence in the Romanian post-Decembrist history.

In 1994 Romania was the first country to adhere to the PfP program. Since then, both the decision-makers and the armed forces started to think in western-like patterns. The new roles and missions such as participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have attached new dimensions to the professionalization development. The process reached a culmination point when a Romanian battalion was accepted to

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[115] George Maior and Sebastian Huluban, in *Baltic Defense Review*, nr. 8, Vol. 2 (2002), 109.

[116] As regards the Romanian military strengths in 1989, different scholars promote different figures. However, the majority of scholars argue that by the end of Cold War, the Romanian army was counting some 320,000 soldiers (e.g. Marian Zulean. "Professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces", in Forster et al. *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe*, Palgrave (2002), 121. George Maior and Mihaela Matei "Defense Policy Developments: Old and New Missions for the Armed Forces" *Occasional Paper* No. 1(2)/2002. Larry Watts "Chapter 2 – "Stressed and strained civil-military relations in Romania, but successfully reforming", In *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change*. (Eds.) Hans Born et al., New York: Routledge, 2006, 21).

participate 'shoulder by shoulder' with American forces in the Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan. The participation of Romanian units in stabilization and reconstruction Operation Iraqi Freedom came as a matter-of-course.

Foster, Edmunds and Cottey define professionalization as "a set process whereby armed forces become closer to the ideal type of professional military."[117] Conceivably, the Romanian armed forces are still far from this ideal type, however, they are heading in the right direction.

The supportive civic culture represents another important dimension in achieving objective civil control. In Romania, the military enjoys a broad public support and in the majority of surveys, the armed forces occupy the second place in the hierarchy of respected institutions, following the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the reduced number of NGOs and, more important, the absence of think-tanks with expertise in the defense sector represent the weak link in achieving objective control. However, by means of the Romanian National Defense College, the awareness of defense issues among government officials, politicians, parliamentarian experts and media has been significantly increased in recent years.

In sum, if an analysis of Romanian civil-military relations in communist Romania is to be done based on Huntington's theory, only the constitutional form of subjective control would be appropriate. During the transition to democracy, objective civil control over the armed forces has started to crystallize.

2.   The Typology of Desch: Internal and External Security Environment

Nevertheless, the major shifts that occurred in Romanian civil-military relations in the aftermath of the Cold War were due to changing international and regional security arrangements, and the attached risks and threats challenging the national defense. Consequent adjustments at the level of the roles and missions, structural changes and policy developments were consequences of these new conditions.

An interesting argument according to which internal and external threats affect civil-military relations has been developed by Michael Desch. According to the author,

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[117] Anthony Foster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottey "The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe" (New York, NY: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2002), 7.

by measuring the perception of the threat, both internal and external, four situations may occur: (1) low internal threat and low external threat, (2) high internal threat and high external threat, (3) low internal and high external threat, and (4) high internal and low external threat.[118]

The straightforward situations of civil-military relations to analyze are those in which one of the threats is high and the other is low: civil-military relations are either good or bad. A level of uncertainty and subjective appraisal exists when both internal and external threats are either high or low. It depends on how we answer questions such as those which are posed by the author, whose perception (of the military, government or society) and how different players are affected by this perception.

A threat affects the entire political-military and social spectrum of a country. Thus, the three opposing players are the state (its institutions), the society and the military. Desch argues that an internal threat that does not affect the military will probably not affect civil-military relations. When the military is affected by internal threat, then it is willing to intervene in policy.

Three situations may be distinguished when the military feels threatened: (1) when it is threatened by both the state and the society, (2) when the state threatens both the society and the military, and (3) when the society threatens both the state and the military. The end results of the above are described by Desch as follows. First, when the military is threatened by the society and state institutions, the conflict is likely to end with the military in power. Second, when the state is the "public enemy no. 1," it is likely that the intervention of the military in politics changes the government with a different civilian leadership. Third, the case in which the society threatens both the military and the state could lead to a coalition between the military and the state and in the worst case to civilian dictatorship, sustained by the military, as Desch claims.

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[118] Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 14.

When explaining the external threat, Desch puts it straightforwardly: "External threats have certain effects: they threaten the entire state, including the military; they usually produce increased unity within the state; and they focus everyone's attention outward."[119]

It is arguable that external threats affect the three players – state, society and military – in the same manner. It is true that when the state and military intelligence agencies are relatively transparent (as they should be in democratic regimes), the society adopts the same positions as the state or the military. However, in non-democratic regimes, depending on the information available, each actor will build its own "map of threats;" thus, it will perceive the external threat in its own way.[120]

Internal and external threats have been considered during the former regime and they influenced to some degree the civil-military relations. The Romanian Communist Party strictly controlled the military through political commissars and the *'Securitate,'* thus the probability of a military *coup-d'état* remained low. Society did not perceive the military as a threat since the principal repression apparatus of the state was the *'Securitate'* and its riot control forces.[121] Therefore, as in the case of all totalitarian states, the state represented a threat to the society and the military.

The perception of an external threat, mainly after the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, increased the role and importance of the defense issues on the party agenda but did not contribute to a change in the civil-military relations. As Daniel Nelson states, "the military policies of the Ceausescu regime turned towards a strategy of national defense modeled after Yugoslavia."[122] The strategy, based on a "war of entire

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[119] Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 12.

[120] The point here is not that in democracy the information is available for public; the 'non-democratic' term is used to underline the situation of Romania during the communist period.

[121] The miners' riot in 1977 was ended by negotiations between Ceausescu and their leaders, but the security forces had their role in uncovering and arresting the miners who were actively involved in rioting; on 15 November 1987 the riot in Braşov was ended by arrests made by the security forces (riot control forces in the Securitate). Started as social revolt, the strike became a political oriented riot (workers asked Ceauşescu's resignation).

[122] Daniel N. Nelson, *Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era* (New York, NY: Gordon and Breach Science Publisher, 1988), 183.

people," reduced the sway of the Romanian Army in accomplishing its fundamental mission – the defense of the country. This fact automatically triggered the diminishing of the resources of the armed forces.

In the transition period, things are more complex. The internal clashes arise mainly between the people and the government. Therefore, the first question that arises is whether the armed forces are used in maintaining the internal security order.

After 1989, for about two years, the internal environment that Romania faced was characterized by numerous strikes and demonstrations against the new authorities because of the socio-economic situation of the country. In addition, the ethnic clashes erupted and the legal framework was unclear. Again, the source of the threat to the military and society was represented by the state. Even though Desch affirms that in this situation a military coup is more likely to occur, Romanian armed forces understood the democratic game and did not intervene in politics. However, as Desch's structural theory predicts in the case of "a state facing low external and high internal threats,"[123] the civilian control of the military was weak.

Things started to change after the 1992 elections, when the general situation of the country became more stable. The new Constitution had been approved by a referendum creating a more stable legislative framework. In addition, the reform of the armed forces and the legislative framework regarding the national security were paramount in accomplishing the national objective, meaning the Euro-Atlantic integration. This shift in national priorities generated a change in civil-military relations in general, and civil control in particular, making them evolve from 'worst' to 'mixed.'

The new international security environment after September 11 has had a considerable influence on Romanian civil-military relations. The participation of Romanian battalions, first in Afghanistan in the Enduring Freedom operation and afterwards in Iraq has brought a major contribution to the improvement of civil-military relations. Even though the deployment of Romanian troops outside the country and the engagement in military operations was not caused by an imminent external threat, the

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[123] Michael Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 14.

demonstrated professionalism and the appreciation of NATO counterparts triggered an increased level of trust by the political class and society in the competence of the military. For instance, a military leader, who played a crucial role in the rescue of three Romanian journalists hijacked in Iraq, has become the presidential advisor for security matters and there are chances to become the chief in charge of the long-awaited and debated intelligence community.

To summarize, the professionalism of the military and the common goal of civilian and military institutions regarding national security affairs have driven to a significant improvement in civil-military relations and to a new type of civilian control. Furthermore, the ties between the military and society at large witnessed a major development. This phenomena became visible with the unconditional support expressed by the Romanian population not only in regards to the NATO accession process, but also to sending troops to theatres of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which was not a common feature of the countries in CEE region.

C.   THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY

Another issue of interest when it comes to analyzing civil-military relations is the relationship between the military and society. While common patterns may be observed when analyzing the developments seen in countries in CEE, national specificities can be underlined in the case of Romania as well. As Caparini put it in 2003,

> The post-communist states… shared a common experience under communism that continues to affect the polities and societies to this day. The members of this sub-region have also been influenced in their military and political reform by Western actors and processes, including NATO and EU enlargement.[124]

In the case of Romania, the Army's participation in the December 1989 Revolution on the side of the population brought about a good relationship between the military and society, a high level of credibility of the armed forces and trust among the population: throughout sixteen years of democracy, the military ranked the second in the

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[124] Marina Caparini, In *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change*. (Eds.) Born et al., (New York: Routledge, 2006), 9.

opinion polls, after the church. Unlike the Latin American post-authoritarian regimes, the perception of the military in CEE countries, including Romania, was not that of a danger, and no praetorian trends existed, while "the record of the Romanian military is fairly healthy and supportive of civilian control," as argued by Ioan Mircea Pascu, former Minister of Defense (2000-2004).[125]

Another set of consistent evidence regarding the high credibility and trust that the Romanian armed forces enjoy in relationship with citizens refers to the perception of the "strategic objectives" represented by NATO and the EU membership, as both organizations declared that democratic control of the military is a precondition for accession.[126]

According to the most recent opinion polls administered by the Centre of Urban Regional Sociology (CURS), the Romanian population above 18 years of age has the highest level of trust in institutions with traditional authority: the Church (80-85%) is followed by the Armed Forces (70%-77%), and mass-media (60%-63%).[127] For instance, the public support for NATO integration reached an impressive figure of 85% among the Romanian population, while throughout different generations of reforms, and the political support expressed an unequivocal cross-party support for NATO membership.[128]

There is not much evidence of a link between the European Union candidacy and civil-military relations, although some studies attempt to address this issue.[129] According to the opinion polls regarding the future EU accession and the impact of EU membership on security and defense, the majority of respondents indicated as "the main advantage for Romania in case of EU accession" the increase of living standard (15%), the

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[125] Ioan Mircea Pascu, "Defense Planning in Emerging Democracies: the Case of Romania", In: *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe; Guarding the Guards. One Europe Or Several*? (Eds.) Cottey et al., (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001, 131.

[126] Charles Moskos, Preface to the book *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change*. by Born et al., (New York: Routledge, 2006), xiii-xv.

[127] Sebastian Lazaroiu – "Increderea in institutiile statului" [Trust and credibility of state's institutions] – in: *Jurnalul National*, 19 October 2006.

[128] See *Romania on its way to NATO,* Bucharest: Ministry of Public Information, 2002, 163-4.

[129] See, for instance, Aylin-Guney and Petek Karatekelio Glu. "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects" *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Spring 2005), 439–62.

abandonment of visas and free circulation in EU (10%), while only 1% of respondents believe that "national security and defense" would improve as a result of joining the European Union.[130]

D. DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In a series of two articles published in the *NATO Review* in late 1996 and early 1997, Chris Donnelly, the NATO Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs analyzed the difficulties of "creating effective armed forces within a democracy and market economy" in the countries of the region.[131] Both articles build on relevant theories on civil-military relations and military professionalism, such as those promoted by Huntington and Janowitz. Beyond a thorough analysis of the difficulties seen by the countries in the region in regards to defense reform and civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era, the articles make consistent proposals regarding a possible strategy to address the issues. Many of them refer to concrete ways of improving civilian control, defense efficiency and military effectiveness, while taking into account the specific challenges posed by the legacies of communist regimes.[132]

In the first article, the author addresses the issue of efficiency in defense spending, and the issue of cost-effectiveness of national defense in the context of new geo-strategic situation of the post-Cold-War era. Getting the best value of public money becomes an imperative that diminishes the gap between old and new democracies of

Europe. As a result of "the diminishing differences in cost-effectiveness of different

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[130] See: *Opinion Poll representative at a national level for the Project on the National Branding*, made during 14-21 July 2005, by the Centre of Urban Regional Sociology CURS-SA at the request of the (Romanian) Agency for Governmental Strategies, http://www.publicinfo.ro/library/sc/sondaj_brand.pdf, (accessed December 6, 2006).

[131] Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies", *NATO Review*, No. 6 - Nov. 1996, Vol. 44, pp. 20-23, Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem"**,** *NATO Review*, Vol. 45 No. 1 (Jan. 1997), 15-19.

[132] Although the case study is tailored for Russia, many similarities may be distinguished with the new democracies of CEE, all of them sharing the legacies of Soviet-style army.

national forces," the author observes that "'Fat' armed forces have become leaner, costs have evened out."[133]

In an attempt to draw on patterns regarding the national differences in costs, Donnelly proposes two models: a) Model 1 is "a force which is designed only for home defense, with a tiny professional cadre and mass mobilization" (which is reminiscent of the "mass armies" of communist Central and Eastern Europe) and b) Model 2 – "where the army is based on a permanent volunteer force, trained and equipped to accomplish a wide variety of tasks, from high intensity combat to peacekeeping and internal security tasks around the globe" (the all-volunteer force embraced by the majority of new NATO member states, including Romania).

The author acknowledges the pain of defense reform in young democracies of CEE, on their rocky road to transition towards Model 2. Unlike the NATO states whose model they try to follow, the pain of the restructuring process in CEE countries is even higher, given the economic situation (scarcity of resources) and the inability of the state to provide appropriate social measures to redundant military personnel, such as adequate compensation packages, or second-career opportunities. As Donnelly argues, among the common challenges are the following:

> All must now face the dilemma of reassessing national security requirements and creating structures to manage them; of ensuring an adequate defense budget to build a sovereign army; of deciding how to go quickly from the mass Soviet-style army to one which reflects truly national requirements; and of explaining to their populations the changed nature of this new military animal and its relationship with society.[134]

Beyond the challenges they represent, and irrespective of the model embraced, the above were addressed almost without exception by the defense reform initiatives of CEE countries, as "A country without effective armed forces cannot either assure its sovereignty or make the necessary contribution to an alliance."[135] Going further, the

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133 Chris Donnelly, *NATO Review*, Vol. 44, No. 6 (Nov. 1996), 20-23.

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

author concludes the study by offering concrete policy recommendations that clearly remind us of the dimensions of the civil-military relations trinity.

In the second article, published in the first issue of the *NATO Review* of 1997, Chris Donnelly attempts to draw on a framework for tackling the "defense transformation in the new democracies." The author builds on the positive aspects involved by the external pressures exercised by NATO allies to help partner countries in their efforts to reform the defense and security sectors. Acknowledging the "dramas and tensions resulting from the restructuring, reform and downsizing which confront the national armed forces themselves," Donnelly argues that "establishing effective management of defense and security policies" is an issue that is "just being recognized" at the beginning of 1997.[136]

As the author recommends, reforming the framework of defense and security requires a "total reassessment of their national security requirements," as well as "developing new mechanisms and procedures for elaborating national security policy and for crisis management, a major restructuring and downsizing of the military system, a reorientation of the officer corps and of the military philosophy generally, and a far-reaching reform of the military-industrial procurement and production system."[137]

The author does not believe in ready-made recipes. Very much the contrary: in his view, the national democratic ownership of drafting and implementing defense reform and the National Security Strategy are of great importance. Beyond some elements of advice, experience and know-how, "No external agency, individual or institution can provide an answer," as Donnelly argues. Acknowledging the legacies of communism, with "a permanently semi-mobilized state" and the corollary supra-dimensional army, Chris Donnelly recommends a radical shift of military philosophy, given the fact that the army's "entire basis for operation and even existence has been changed fundamentally."

In Donnelly's words, 'defense reform,' covers restructuring the armed forces so that they reflect the need for defending an independent state and the reorientation of

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[136] Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem," *NATO Review*, Vol. 45 No. 1 (Jan. 1997), 15-9, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1997/9701-4.htm, (accessed December 16, 2006).

[137] Ibid.

military psychology to come to terms with operating in a democracy. Furthermore, defense reform "requires not just technical restructuring but changes in attitudes within the armed forces, as well as better communication among the various actors involved."[138]

Both articles draw attention to the objectives of defense reform and restructuring in the countries of CEE, the complex circumstances in which they were implemented, and the challenges facing policy-makers involved in the above. Building on the concrete experiences of the countries in the region and lessons learnt during the difficult transition process good governance and sustainable development, the work of Chris Donnelly is of critical importance for the study of defense reform.

E.   CONCLUSION

To summarize, the countries in the CEE region faced similar challenges regarding the inherited patterns of civil-military relations. These refer to the Soviet-style 'mass armies,' based on the conscription system, and the military doctrine that promoted the 'war of the entire people,' a debatable professionalism of the armed forces, with its corollary regarding the politicization of the military. The issues of defense efficiency and effectiveness were almost ignored during the dictatorship.

Both theories that were applied to analyze the state of civil-military relations – Huntington's theory of civilian-control and the structural theory of civil-military relations of Desch – provided us with useful information for a systematic understanding of the roots of civil-military relations and the relationship between the military and society at large. Moreover, Desch's theory is particularly useful, given the new security environment, as it adds a new dimension, the international one, to the classical attempts to understand civil-military relations.

Donnelly's contribution provides an extremely valuable framework for analysis of the defense transformation process in the countries of CEE. According to the author, analyzing the context in which the changes in defense and security occur has a major role in helping us to analyze further developments regarding the reform and restructuring

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[138] Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem," *NATO Review*, Vol. 45 No. 1 (Jan. 1997), 15-9.

process, the legislative changes operated to enforce them, and the difficulties encountered when implementing the ambitious reform objectives regarding various aspects entrenched in civil-military relations.

Such evidence proves to be essential for a better understanding of the complex challenges to be addressed by Romania's defense reform, as well as for further evaluation of the national authorities' progress with civil-military relations after the Revolution of December 1989.

IV.   CASE STUDY: ROMANIA'S DEFENSE REFORMS AND PROGRESS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE THE DECEMBER 1989 REVOLUTION

A.   ROMANIA'S DEFENSE REFORM SINCE THE 1989 REVOLUTION

Taking into account the purpose and the sequential approach of the thesis, a functional periodization of Romania's defense reform since the 1989 Revolution is useful. In this respect, after an introductory sub-chapter that addresses the legacies of communism and Romania's specificity among the CEE countries, my approach to the stages of reform proposes a split of major trends into three generations of defense reform, as follows.

The 'first generation of defense reform' will cover the most difficult period of Romania's transition, between the December 1989 Revolution, with the corresponding regime change, and the 'cold shower'[139] represented by the Madrid Summit of 1997, when Romania did not qualify for NATO accession.

The period between 1998 and the Presidential elections in December 2000 is 'the second generation of defense reform,' when "Easterners and Westerners alike became more aware not only of the progress made, but also of the work ahead," as Sava argues.[140] In addition, some of the lessons learned from the first wave of NATO enlargement and the implementation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) demonstrated the necessity for more committed efforts to demonstrate credibility and interoperability for future accession to NATO. Unfortunately, the laggard political leaders did nothing in line with the awareness expressed by military experts to implement the painful defense reform, as this was the only way to regain credibility and support for NATO membership. The 'third generation of defense reform,' that started in 2004, currently on-going, builds on the most spectacular developments seen by Romania's

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[139] Ionel Nicu Sava also uses the term (see Ionel Nicu Sava, *Civil Military Relations, Western Assistance and Democracy in South Eastern Europe*. G125, Conflict Studies Research Centre. Surrey: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, August 2003), 19.

[140] Ibid.

defense reform. Essential laws and internal policy documents have been implemented during this period, and the progresses culminated with Romania's accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance in the second wave of enlargement, then with integration into the European Union, in January 2007.

The chapter concludes with some remarks regarding the different focuses, objectives and triggers for defense reform throughout the three generations of reforms. As many important programs are on-going challenges facing the Romanian MoD, the political class and military command, these will be also addressed.

Such programs brought about the basic democratic principles of democratic control, accountability, transparency, parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny exercised by civil society over the defense budget and expenditures, all of them being addressed by the thesis at hand when discussing their presence throughout the three generations of defense reform and civil-military relations. Furthermore, these were the dominant patterns for redefining security assistance after the Cold War, which followed three paths, according to Sava: aid-for-development, aid-for-reform and aid-for-integration.[141]

The decisive role of Western assistance in promoting and supporting the design and implementation of defense reform will be emphasized.

As argued by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster in the Introductory chapter of their book of 2002, the "democratic control of the military requires a number of more specific elements for it to be effective," as follows: a) an apolitical military, b) a clear chain of command for the armed forces, c) a civilian minister of defense, d) the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense, and e) a degree of transparency with regard to the defense budget.[142]

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[141] Ionel Nicu Sava, "Western (NATO /PfP) Assistance to Build Democratic civil-military relations in South Eastern Europe. The case of Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia. Final Report, The Manfred Wörner Fellowship 2001-2002, (Bucharest, November 2002), 7.

[142] Andrew Cottey, Chapter 1, In: *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe; Guarding the Guards. One Europe Or Several*?, Eds. Cottey et al. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001), 7.

1. **'First Generation of Defense Reform' (between the Revolution of December 1989 and the NATO Madrid Summit of 1997)**

In the aftermath of the Cold War, along with the end of mass armies, special attention was given to the democratization of CEE, and the attached "critical security sector reform goal" of establishing mechanisms for democratic control of armed forces. Most of the Western assistance was absorbed into this process.

During the early 1990s, Western assistance and support was channeled towards building institutional capacity and good governance, re-establishing state institutions' legitimacy and setting up the basic framework of democratic principles, to include the rule of law, transparency, and accountability, alongside more quantifiable objectives, such as downsizing and restructuring of the state's apparatus, including the military organization, under the circumstances of severe economic constraints and need for prioritizing the objectives of defense reform. It is worth mentioning that during this period, donor agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) played a crucial role in driving the public administration reforms and related assistance, through the mechanisms of conditionalities attached to structural adjustment programs, while other security and defense institutions, such as the NATO, OSCE, and European Union exercised a limited influence. Understandably, they would come to play a more important role only in the later years of the first generation of defense reform, through the mechanisms provided by the Partnership for Peace arrangements starting in 1994, and the forthcoming PARP and MAP instruments, using the incentive of enlargement and defense reviews as triggers for defense reform, stimulated by means of the training programs, know-how transfer, and in-house assistance provided by foreign advisors.

An interesting attempt by a group of military professionals to break with the peaceful but sluggish transformation and democratization of the army took place in the early 1990s, and this has been addressed by authors like Nestor Ratesh and Tom Gallagher. In his 1991 book dedicated to the Romanian Revolution of 1989, Ratesh briefly addresses the Romanian army's democratization movement during 1990. According to the author, the Committee for Action to Democratize the Army (CADA),

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created shortly after the Revolution (in February 1990), was banned after the mid-June 1990 violence of the coal miners who came to Bucharest to force the change of the government, when the CADA was blamed for the army's inaction in the face of political violence.[143] The issue was later considered by Tom Gallagher, who argued that the CADA was founded "by reform-minded officers who wished for a decisive rather than a cosmetic break with the past."[144] According to Gallagher, the role of the Romanian Armed Forces in the political and military circumstances of the early 1990s may be briefly presented as follows: the opposition was weak and divided, the democratic checks and balances were absent, and there was an intense competition for limited state resources. On this background, the role of the armed forces was radically reconsidered, as it was expected to fill a political vacuum left by the collapse of civilian authorities.[145] This may explain the overwhelming focus on democratic civilian control over the armed forces during the first generations of defense reform, and the focus of Western assistance on projects to enhance civilian control, to the detriment of efficiency and effectiveness, the other two pillars of the civil-military relations trinity, as presented by Bruneau and Trinkunas.[146]

As noted by Gogolewska when analyzing the developments of Polish defense reform and civil-military relations, "NATO and other Western observers promoted a model of civilian control that focused on a civilian minister of defense and promoting military socialization to democracy."[147]

Despite clear delimitations between the responsibilities of the bureaucracy represented by the MoD and the General Staff, in practice the sharing between strategic policy-making and operations' command did not enjoy a smooth relationship. Like in the

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[143] Ratesh, Nestor. *Romania : The Entangled Revolution*. The Washington Papers. Vol. 152. Washington, D.C. (New York: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Praeger, 1991), 139.

[144] Tom Gallagher. *Romania After Ceaușescu: The Politics of Intolerance*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 105, 161-2.

[145] Ibid., 234-5.

[146] Bruneau and Trinkunas. "Global Trends and their impact on Civil-Military Relations", draft chapter of unpublished book (2007). Material provided by the author.

[147] Agnieszka Gogolewska "Problems confronting civilian democratic control in Poland", in Born et al., 2006: 111.

case of Hungary, where the main issue to be solved regarding civil-military relations during 1989-2001 was "the difficult clarification of civil and military responsibilities concerning command and control of the military," or "the integration of the ministry and the General Staff" as Ferenc Molnar[148] argues, Romania's attempts to draw a line between the responsibilities of the administrative, bureaucratic apparatus empowered with key decision-making regarding the national defense policy, legal harmonization and procurement, and its civilian leadership on the one hand, and the General Staff, on the other hand proved to be extremely delicate. Arguably, this is an issue that even long-established democracies still have to deal with, as it brings about the distribution of roles between the MoD (defense planning, guidance and know-how transfer regarding legislative harmonization, human resources, finance and accountability) and strategic and operations' command exercised by the chief of General Staff, and most probably a final resolution in this respect will be a long-term goal.

But the issues of roles and missions assigned to the armed forces, and the distribution of responsibilities between the MoD and the General Staff during crisis management operations or peace-support operations raises serious concerns regarding the issue of effectiveness. That is because, as observed by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, there is a series of factors that justify the interdependence between defining and implementing the set of roles and missions to be performed by the armed forces, and military effectiveness, among which the following appear to be the most important: a) the wide variety of roles and missions; b) the fact that "roles and missions cannot be effectively achieved without resources, to include money, equipment and training"; c) inter-agency cooperation is needed; d) the roles and missions "viewed in the context of coalitions and alliances," as the authors argue.[149]

Constitutional and legal reforms were critical at this point, as they established the new roles and missions of the security and defense institutions, putting them on a liberal

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[148] Ferencz Molnar, "Civil-military relations in Hungary. From competition to co-operation" In: *Civil-Military Relations in Europe. Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change*, (eds.) Hans Born et al. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 115.

[149] T. Bruneau and H. Trinkunas. "Global Trends and their impact on Civil-Military Relations," draft chapter of unpublished book (2007). Material provided by the author.

democratic basis, where the rule of law and the clear separation of powers prevailed, as argued by Biljana Valkovska. However, Douglas Bland goes further and draws attention to the different, still interdependent levels of analysis to be considered when addressing the issue of "a shared responsibility" in liberal democracies. Thus, according to the author, "In most states, four central decision matrices drive defense policy and management: strategic (set of decisions about means and ends of defense), organizational (decisions about arrangements of defense resources and internal responsibilities), social (decisions about armed forces and society) and operational (decisions about the employment of forces).[150]

However, democratic control and civilian oversight over the armed forces cannot be limited to legal and constitutional settlements. As argued by Born, Haltiner and Malešic in the introductory chapter of a book of 2004, the essence of this period can be summarized as follows: "armed forces are being reduced and restructured, as well as military missions and priorities are being redefined,"[151] while the need to internationalize the issue of democratic control of the armed forces is a must.[152]

As regards Romania, a major restructuring was made during this period, as the missions of the armed forces abandoned the concept of the "mass armies" and territorial defense of 1989 to a more flexible and affordable army, which was cut in 1997 to about a half of its initial military strength, reaching a peacetime active force of 163,523 soldiers, of which 76,345 were conscripts.[153]

But severe restructuring and downsizing were not ends in themselves. As stressed out by Chris Smith, based on the review of the World Development Report of 1997, "size is irrelevant when judged against effectiveness." Then, the author continues by stressing

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[150] See Biljana Valkovska (Chapter 4) and Douglas Bland (Chapter 2), In: *Renaissance of democratic control of armed forces in contemporary societies*, (Eds.) H. Born, K. Haltiner and M. Malešic, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 47 and 26-7 respectively.

[151] Hans Born, Karl Haltiner and Marjan Malešic, *Renaissance of democratic control of armed forces in contemporary societies*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004), 14-5.

[152] Ibid., 158.

[153] Lary Watts. *Democratic Civil Control of the Military in Romania: An Assessment as of October 2001,* Civil-Military Relations in Post Cold War Europe, G102. United Kingdom: Conflict Studies Resource Centre, (December 2001), 17.

that "Reform rather than downsizing was thus the primary requisite guiding the transformation of the state… in post-communist European nations," while the two state reform strategies as follows: a) matching states' activities with capabilities (financial, human and technological resources) – in the short run; and b) improving state's capabilities through reforms of public institutions – in the long term.[154]

Following Schmitter's approach to civil-military relations, with the two assumptions to enforce it – "keeping the military out of politics" and "keeping civilian authorities from drawing the military into politics," and Donnelly's argument[155] that by embracing it, the governments of CEE isolated military commands (General Staff) from civilian (political) leaders, Larry Watts[156] argues that the Western model, focusing on civilian control has proven to be "counterproductive and superfluous" when adopted by the countries of CEE. Thus, according to Watts, approaching civil-military relations in a static manner is among the pathologies of Western civilian control over the military, which brings about "formal indicators" – and superficial, one could argue – to measure civilian control, such as the number of civilians appointed within the Defense Ministries. While civilians' presence in leadership positions is visible proof and is easily measurable, these may also hide more profound deductions regarding the real "ability of civilians to exercise that control."[157]

Watts goes further and argues that Romania presents a special case in this respect, as the national authorities refused to align themselves to this trend that encourages the appointment of civilian inexpert appointees, who "exerted virtually no control over the military." Thus, while the country enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from Moscow during communism, Romania, the critiques for its resistance to appoint civilians lacking

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[154] Chris Smith, "Security Sector Reform: development breakthrough or institutional engineering*?" Conflict and Security Development*. 1(1) (2001), 8 -9.

[155] Chris Donnelly, "Developing a National Strategy for the Transformation of the Defense Establishment in Post-Communist States," *European Security,* Vol. 5, No. 1 (1996), 1-12.

[156] Larry Watts was a security sector reform consultant to the Romanian Presidency. Serving in this capacity under many administrations, he is the champion of the defense reform analyses as addressed by Romanian political and military officials.

[157] Larry Watts. "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control," *Journal of Political & Military Sociology,* Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2002), 52-3.

military training and highly competent, also observed by Joo,[158] turned out to be later appreciated, as this reticence prevented the country from "overt politicization, and civilian micromanagement" and brought about "retaining efficiency and keeping the military out of political infighting."[159]

Given the above, a review of key constitutional and legal arrangements, but also critical institutions created to enforce them may prove valuable at this point.

The first Constitution of Romania was approved in 1991, and came into force in 1992, framing the essential arrangements for a clear separation of powers, defining the roles and missions of the armed forces and state authorities in the new security context, and setting the principles of civilian control and oversight, through the defense commissions that were established at the level of the Parliament and the Executive. A good overview of the constitutional and legal prescriptions regarding the Romanian Armed Force in the semi-presidential regime is provided by Marian Zulean, in an article published in spring of 2004.[160] The Constitution of 1991 was changed by Referendum in 2003, and changes to the initial document addressed crucial issues for future NATO accession. Thus, the modifications were made to eliminate technical/legal limitations for future NATO membership and to prepare the end of the conscription system in favor of an all-volunteer force. One of the key legal requirements for future NATO membership regards the adequate constitutional and legal provisions on the participation to collective defence operations. Thus, as stipulated by Article 118 of the revised Romanian Constitution of 2003, "the foreign troops can enter, station or transit the territory of our country in accordance with the laws in force and the international treaties signed by

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[158] R. Joo, *The Democratic Control of Armed Forces*, 1996.

[159] Larry Watts "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control". In: *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* Vol. 30 No. 1 (Summer 2002), 55-65.

[160] See Marian Zulean "Changing Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Southeastern Europe". *Mediterranean Quarterly*, (Spring 2004), 62-3.

Romania," while "the Romanian Armed Forces may contribute to collective defence within military alliances and can participate in operations to maintain and re-establish peace."[161]

Other key institutions were set up during this period, and a significant number of legislative packages accompanied the reforms efforts. Thus, the National Supreme Defense Council was established by Law 39/1990, further modified by Law 415/2002. As stated by Larry Watts, "The CSAT is the most important locus of security reform and defense planning, bringing together all executive authority in Romania's semi-presidential system where the presidency is primarily responsible for national security and foreign policy and the Prime Minister for domestic administration."[162]

Also important during this period is the elaboration and implementation of the basic laws regulating the national defense of Romania (Law 45/1994 of the National Defense of Romania), or the successive legal arrangements regarding the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense: Law 41/1990, Emergency Ordinance 74/2000, Law 389/2001 for the approval of Emergency Ordinance of the Government 14/2001 on the Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense (the latter being modified this year by the Law 346/2006). But leaving aside the minor change in name of the institution (from "Ministry of National Defense" to "Ministry of Defense") the Law 346/2006, currently applicable, does not propose many or radical changes regarding the organization of central structures, under the direct subordination of the Minister of Defense, and even lesser changes have been operated on the key responsibilities/attributes of central structures and the reporting flows. As regards the following organizational charts to be implemented, these are still in the process of being drafted by the Romanian Ministry of Defense.

During the transition, international organizations such as NATO, the European Union and the OSCE played a critical role in supporting, advising and directing

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[161] *Law No. 429/2003 on the Revision of the Constitution of Romania* was approved by the national referendum of 18-19 October 2003, and came into force on 29 October 2003. (Published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No. 758, Oct. 29, 2003).

[162] Larry Watts, "The Transformation of Romanian Civil-Military Relations: Enabling Force Projection," *European Security* Vol. 14, No. 1 (March, 2005), 97.

Romania's reform efforts towards the establishment of democratic political control over the military and norms on democratic civil-military relations. The adoption of the OSCE Code of Conduct and NATO's PfP framework proved essential in this respect. To a large extend, Romania's accession to NATO was partly possible because of the participation in exercises as a member of the NATO PfP program, since its launching in 1994. Also, the tools promoted within the PfP framework – such as IPAP, PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building), PARP (Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process and PAP-T (Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism) – had a decisive contribution to the country's preparedness to join the North-Atlantic Alliance. Among them, the PARP made NATO's extensive experience in defense planning and the interoperability criteria of the Alliance available to the partners, and encouraged their involvement in the decision-making and planning processes. Such tools contributed significantly to their preparation for accession, through the periodic review of the level reached in achieving the Interoperability Objectives, (further Partnership Goals - PGs), mutually agreed by the representatives of NATO and the partners.[163]

When establishing the priorities of defense reform during the 1990s, the Romanian authorities found themselves between external conditionality and the need for internal credibility and commitment. A series of USAID and EU-PHARE projects were launched, to shape and implement primarily public administration reforms and *a Civil Service Law no. 188*, which was adopted only in late 1999, ten years after the December 1989 Revolution. [164]

Due to political instability and lack of internal commitment and realism when establishing the objectives of reforms, rather "cosmetic changes" were pursued during this period, and after registering major difficulties in implementation, many projects were

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[163] *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Edition 2006, electronic resource http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030208.htm, (accessed October 23, 2006).

abandoned, as the ambitious objectives that were set rather to satisfy the pressures exercised by foreign advisors than based on a realistic assessment of the competing priorities of the MoD.

Only in 1994, later than her CEE neighbors, Romania appointed a civilian Defense Minister: Gheorghe Tinca, a diplomat by education and experience.

Overall, Romania had not embarked upon convincing progress during the early 1990s, partly because of a lack of political will and commitment, or because of limited know-how transfer, and this was made clear during the Madrid Summit in 1997, when Romania's hopes for NATO accession were rebuffed. This period also represents the beginning of the professionalization of the armed forces, and a decisive contribution in this respect were the joint exercises organized under the PfP auspices, but also the Western assistance provided through the means of training abroad or in-country seminars, and the know-how transfer promoted through the foreign advisors.

The Romanian MoD faced a serious reorganization only in May 1997, with changes that affected both central structures and combat forces. Coincidentally or not, also in 1997, the Human Resources Management Directorate was established, by merging the former Personnel Directorate and Military Education and Training Directorate.

A radical shift of vision and strategy was implemented, alongside the newly-introduced Concept of Human Resource Management, which put on new basis the professionalization of the armed forces, recruitment and selection, military career and training.

In this stage of reforms, a strong relationship between the NATO enlargement process and the progress with democratic civil-military relations and broader military reforms in the ten countries to join NATO in 2004 could be observed.[165] As a political and military alliance, NATO played a decisive role both in "promoting and consolidating civilian control of the armed forces" and in "setting the agenda for structural reforms

[164] Civil Service Law 188/1999, (Bucharest: Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 600, Dec.8, 1999).

[165] Timothy, Edmunds, "NATO and its New Members," *Survival* Vol. 45, no. 3 (September 1, 2003), 145-65.

across the military organizations."[166] According to Timothy Edmunds, NATO's influence was strongly connected to the enlargement agenda, and that was possible under four circumstances, as follows: a) to tie the incentive of membership to reform; b) technical assistance and advice, as NATO was a pool of experience and expertise, to be shared with the partners through the means of NATO-sponsored seminars, conferences, and multinational military exercises; c) effective and transparent mechanisms for defense planning and budgeting were implemented; and d) the propagation and reinforcement of democratic norms of behavior. [167]

To sum up, one could assert that the first generation reforms were politically related, and that NATO's influence was still limited. Among the common problems that challenged the transitional democracies of the region, the following are the most important, according to some scholars: a) the absence of information on the armed forces and defense spending, b) a poor analysis of defense policy choices, c) unrealistic assessments to match available resources to ambitious objectives and alternative defense policy options, and d) bureaucracies that were unwilling and unable to implement policy decisions.[168]

In 1995, *NATO's Study of Enlargement* made it clear that democratic civilian control requires more than "maximization of civil power": it includes "effective governance of the defense sector in a framework of democratic accountability and transparency." [169]

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[166] Ibid., 145.

[167] Ibid., 150-2, 156.

[168] Ibid., 149. See also the detailed analysis provided by Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster. "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* Vol. 29, no. 1 (Fall, 2002), 31.

[169] Timothy Edmunds, "NATO and its New Members," *Survival* Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sep 1, 2003), 148.

2. 'Second Generation of Defense Reform' (between the Disappointment of NATO Madrid Summit in 1997 and the Successful NATO Accession in April 2004)

As observed during the first and second generations of defense reform, preparing for NATO membership was a way to speed up the reform process not only of the military organization, but of the entire Romanian society. Proving continuity, responsibility and credibility were the overarching guiding principles of the Romanian approach to NATO accession, but also constituted important political and military triggers for the defense reform process since the 1989 Revolution. Following the NATO Summit held in Madrid in 1997, the pace of defense reform, and their effectiveness increased significantly. That is because it brought about a more targeted and effective approach to defense reform, primarily designed to meet the NATO accession objectives.

The radical shift seen in the defense policy doctrines during the 1990s, had to reflect, in turn, the new roles and missions of the armed forces, as argued by Maior and Matei in a study published in 2002. Accordingly, it appeared obvious that "For countries in Eastern Europe, finding appropriate balance between threats and capacities in planning the defense has been a challenging issue,"[170] an issue that has been realized only during the latter stages of reforms. As stated by the authors of the study,

> The missions of the armed forces have been derived from four correlated defense policy objectives: integration in NATO and EU; finalizing the reform process in order to acquire modern, flexible and sustainable defense capabilities; developing the mechanisms for civil and democratic oversight; and improving Romania's status as a security provider through maintaining and increasing its contribution to regional stability.[171]

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[170] George Cristian Maior and Mihaela Matei, "Defense Policy Developments: Old and New Missions for the Armed Forces", Occasional Papers No. 1(I) (Bucharest: Romanian Ministry of Defense, Department for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, 2002).

[171] Ibid., 13-4.

According to the new planning provisions, starting with 1997, a number of force reviews were done,[172] adjusting the armed forces composition, which are structured on: a) Active Forces – which include a package of capabilities designed for participation in Article 5-type missions – for immediate and rapid reaction; b) Territorial Forces (with low- reaction capabilities); and c) Reserve Forces.[173] This allocation of forces proved to be the optimal one until integration into NATO, and the subsequent decision to abandon the conscription system in favor of an all-volunteer force, believed to result in additional effectiveness, which has been in place since January 2007.

In 1999, on the occasion of the NATO Summit in Washington, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched as a tool to support countries aspiring to join NATO in their preparations through objective standards and benchmarking for their progress. Drawing extensively on the lessons learned during the accession process of the three countries to join NATO in the first wave of post-Cold War accessions (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), the MAP cycles constitute a comprehensive benchmarking instrument for self-evaluation, and an extremely valuable tool for Romania to understand the standards promoted by the alliance, and to practice the military and political dialogue with the NATO representatives, prior to accession.[174]

A more focused and field-specific Western support and assistance to Romania's defense reform, as well as more efficient know-how transfer, especially from the NATO member states became visible during late 1990s. It consisted of training opportunities (in Romania or abroad), the assignment of foreign military instructors in military education and training institutions (such as the NCO Training Center in Pitesti, the elite NCOs for

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[172] Maior and Matei (2002), 14. The first in a series of force reviews conducted by the Romanian authorities, *FARO (Romanian Armed Forces) 2005-2010*, stated the necessity of overall restructuring (a reduction of the armed forces to a total of 112,000 military personnel, further diminished to 90,000 by January 1, 2007), and "an increase of combat capabilities, training and education, along with achieving interoperability with NATO forces in terms of standards and procedures". (Bucharest, MoD, 2004).

[173] Ibid., 14.

[174] NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) is "a program of advice, assistance and practical support (and assessment, I would continue), tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance". Annually, the North Atlantic Council reviews the progresses registered by the country in terms of programs covering political, economic, defense and security, and legal aspects. See NATO Handbook, electronic version, available on-line at http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html, (accessed October 22, 2006).

the Land Forces; or the NATO PfP Training Center in Bucharest), or appointing of foreign advisors to high-level leadership. Key contributors in this respect were the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, and many of them were concerned with the restructuring process, improving human resources management and professionalization of the armed forces.

Beyond the external assistance that gained focus and substance, internally there was more commitment to regain NATO's credibility, which sped up the adoption and implementation of somehow painful policies and legal framework, as we shall see. In regards to the progress seen by human resource management reforms, the downsizing of the military corps continued, even more decisively. Furthermore, active social measures were researched, in order to help the redundant military personnel to re-integrate in the business market. In this respect, the World Bank provided substantial loans for the re-professionalization and post-career assistance of the retired military personnel; in total some $2 million.

But the North-Atlantic Alliance itself learned some lessons throughout the enlargement process. During the first wave of enlargement, military matters were not given much importance, and the intervention of the NATO forces in Kosovo, with the poor performance of the three members (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) was a test in this respect. The lessons learned were successfully applied to the ten candidates to join the alliance in the second wave. As Timothy Edmunds states, rethinking the priorities of the defense reform, meaning the quality of personnel and equipment, and seeking 'more deployable,' flexible forces with a high readiness to fulfill a new mission, were among the essential indicators of defense progress.[175] The necessity to balance the economic constraints on defense spending with the necessity of participation in NATO missions had positive implications for re-thinking the objectives of reforms and the strategies to be employed in order to achieve them. Related to that, the critique of 'two-tier' armed forces may appear justified. It refers to an excessive focus on elite units, to the neglect of the

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[175] Timothy Edmunds, "NATO and its New Members," *Survival* 45, no. 3 (Sep 1, 2003), 157.

bulk of the armed forces, which remain "conscript-based, under-resourced and largely unreformed," as argued by Edmunds.[176]

3. "Third Generation" of Defense Reform (From 2004 to Present)

If the issue of civilian democratic control dominated the discourse of defense reform throughout the 1990s, a new impetus began with a new political class that came to power with the elections in late 2000.

Starting in 2001, major steps forward were made regarding the implementation of the United States' planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) and regarding the Objective Force and of the military through an adequate career system and Selection Boards for military promotions. The first successes were also achieved regarding the modernization of equipment, procurement, as well as in the field of privatizing inefficient defense industries, previously heavily subsidized, or being provided contracts despite the debatable quality of their products.

Among the many pieces of legislation adopted, the following are the most important from the viewpoint of democratic principles of good governance, accountability and transparency: the Law 544/2001 on free access to information in the public interest and the Law 42/2004 on the participation of the armed forces in missions abroad.

In his speech on the occasion of the appointment of Teodor Atanasiu, the Minister of Defense, President Basescu stated that: "We have a reality – the [Romanian] Armed Forces is ahead of the country itself from the viewpoint of modernization. I can assure you that the politics of the Romanian President is to always keep the armed forces one step ahead, because the military organization is one of the moral pillars of the Romanian nation, alongside the Church."[177]

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[176] Ibid., 158.

[177] From the message addressed by Traian Basescu, President of Romania, on the occasion of appointing the new Minister of Defense, Speech. (Bucharest, December 29, 2004).

During this stage of reforms, major policy and strategy documents have been adopted to mirror the challenges raised by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the obligations that derived from the new status Romania gained in the North-Atlantic Alliance. Among these, the White Paper of Security and National Defense (2004), the National Security Strategy (last revised in 2006), and The Military Transformation Strategy (2006), which has as its goal "to build up a modern, completely professionalized structure more mobile, efficient, flexible, deployable and sustainable having the capability to be engaged in a wide spectrum of missions in a joint manner." In achieving its goal, the Military Transformation Strategy of 2006 proposed three ambitious stages: (a) finalizing the basic restructuring (2006-2007), (b) operational integration into NATO and the EU (2008-2015), and (c) technical integration into NATO and the EU (2015-2025).[178]

But beyond recognizing the more decisive defense reform of CEE countries starting with the mid-1990s, the governments' approaches to change and transformation were not free of criticism. While acknowledging that defense reform in the region generally focused on "further reductions in the overall size of armed forces and the development of forces capable of contributing to peace-support operations," a NATO Review published in late 2002 stressed the negative impact these efforts had on developing the "two-tier" militaries to which Edmunds also refers.[179] Thus, the authors of the review drew attention to the divide between "elite cadres capable of operating alongside NATO Allies and the conscript-based bulk of the armed forces whose operational effectiveness is degrading."[180]

Most modernization and training efforts were directed at enhancing the capabilities of units made available to the Alliance in accordance with the Force Goal requirements for different years. Under these circumstances, "less glamorous aspects of defense policy such as training, operations and maintenance, and communications equipment" were postponed, many of them for January 2007, when the conscription

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[178] "Strategia de Transformare a Armatei Romaniei" *(The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy),* 2006, elaborated by the General Staff and approved by the National Supreme Defense Council, is available on-line at http://www.mapn.ro/strategie_transformare.doc. (accessed January 21, 2007)

[179] Timothy Edmunds, "NATO and its new Members", *Survival* Vol. 45, no. 3, (Sept. 2003), 158

[180] A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, and A. Forster. "Beyond Prague" *NATO Review* (Autumn 2002), 31.

system was abandoned in favor of full professionalization of the Romanian army and the adoption of an all-volunteer force system.[181]

During 2005-2006 more than 2,000 Romanian troops were deployed abroad – in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq – to conduct operations under NATO, EU or UN command or as a part of the Coalition of the Willing. According to the number of troops involved to date, "Romania ranks seventh among the nations participating in the Global War on Terrorism." as stipulated in the "Romanian Defense" brochure of 2006.[182] A detailed account of the Romanian contribution with troops in theatre of peace-support operations is presented on the website of the Romanian MoD. [183]

B.   REVISITING ROMANIA'S DEFENSE REFORMS: FIELD-RELATED EFFORTS IN REGARDS TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1.   The Implementation of the PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) in the Romanian Mod

In reviewing how political oversight is exercised over the armed forces, ensuring democratic mechanisms for transparency and accountability, or military effectiveness and defense efficiency, one cannot escape some references to how defense planning and budgeting is implemented and reviewed.[184]

The adoption of the American-proposed PPBS (planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation system) as an integrated defense planning and auditing tool under direct control of a civilian minister is also important, as a mechanism to ensure democratic civilian control over the Romanian Armed Forces, increased efficiency in resource allocation and expert oversight regarding the defense expenditures.

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[181] Ibid.

[182] See the brochure *Romanian Defense,* Romanian Ministry of National Defense, Public Relations Directorate, (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 2006), 15.

[183] See "International Missions", updated Aug. 2006, posted on the Romanian MoD webpage - http://english.mapn.ro/ (accessed January 21, 2007).

[184] Thomas C. Bruneau, and Scott D. Tollefson. *Who Guards the Guardians and how: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Romania applied the PPBS in 2001, the same year when the Defense Integrated Planning Directorate was established and placed under civilian defense leadership (the State Secretary for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department). Until then, as in the case of Poland and Hungary, the planning and allocation of resources was the responsibility of J5/General Staff. The integrated planning and budgeting is regulated by the Defense Planning Directive, a key policy document that is updated annually, and consists of eight major programs which are run by program managers, as follows: Army, Air Force, Navy, Logistic Support, Strategic Command, Defense Intelligence, Central Administration and Pensions, and International Relations. Being founded on Force Projection and the need to adapt the military organization to the new Force Goals (FGs), the Defense Planning Directive is submitted to the Romanian Minister of Defense for approval, after it has been discussed in the Defense Planning Committee. It is one of the essential tools that enhance transparency, external auditing and oversight of the defense expenditures.[185]

The Romanian defense budget since 2000 fluctuated around 2% of GDP, with peaks in 2002 and 2004. But even when the defense budget reached a higher percentage of GDP (i.e., 2.45 percent of the GDP in 2002) in real figures it represented just under $1 billion, while supporting active armed forces of 103,000.[186]

During the negotiations and reviews in light of the future membership in 2004, Romania committed itself to allocating 2.38% of GDP to defense, until 2008. However, due to conflicting priorities, the debate around Romania's inability to fulfill its commitments to the Alliance and the European Union is an on-going issue among Romanian officials. The defense budget for 2006 reached only 1.85% of the GDP, much

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[185] The Romanian Ministry of Defense is currently implementing the provisions of the 7th Defense Planning Directive.

lower than the percent promised to NATO, and both President Traian Basescu and Eugen Badalan, then the Chief of General Staff, have pleaded for an increase, though without much success.[187]

As regards the defense budget for 2007, the draft Law on State Budget for 2007 was approved by the commissions on budget-finance in early November, without major changes to the draft proposed by the Romanian Government. However, one of the most important changes consisted in increasing the funds allocated to the Defense Ministry with some 841 millions ROL, a sum to be spent on modernizing the Armed Forces equipment and infrastructure. In the draft budget, established by the Ministry of Public Finance, the MoD was given 6.797 millions ROL, representing 1,78% of the GDP. Compared with 2006, the net increase was 148.8 million ROL, a budget that "gives no chance to the armed forces [to perform their missions]," as President Basescu has put it, in a speech delivered in October last year, on the occasion of appointing Sorin Frunzaverde, the current Minister of Defense. Supplementing the draft allocation appears to be a must, to allow Romania to accomplish its commitments to NATO and the EU, to participate with troops in peace-support operations and implement the newly adopted full professionalization of the Armed Forces, with its all-volunteer force, starting in January 2007.[188]

[186] Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. "Beyond Prague" *NATO Review* Autumn 2002, p.30.

[187] "Seful statului ar putea refuza promulgarea Legii bugetului 2006" ["The President could refuse the promulgation of the Law on the state budget for 2006"], *Gandul* newspaper (Nov. 7, 2005). Surprisingly, the reaction of Teodor Atanasiu, the Minister of Defense at that time, was very strange: he condemned the Chief of General Staff for "taking the liberty to speak up about the issue", while threatening the Chief of General Staff that can be fired for that. – See Bogdan Chireac, "Ce pazeste Armata." ["What is the armed forces guarding?"], *Gandul* newspaper (October 24, 2004).

[188] Adrian Ilie, "Bugetul Apararii a fost suplimentat de comisiile de buget-finante. Ministerul lui Frunzaverde primeste inca 841 de milioane." [The Defense Budget was supplemented by the commissions for budget-finances. The Ministry ran by Frunzaverde gains another 841 million], *Curierul National* newspaper (Nov. 3, 2006).

2.   A New Strategic Vision Regarding Mod's Human Resource Management

Maybe the most radical innovations in the Romanian military organization regards the progress made in the field of human resource management, as it is inter-connected to issues such as force restructuring and professionalization of the armed forces and civil-military relations, but also interoperability and readiness. Some of the elements of the new policies and strategies can be summarized as follows: a new, motivating and transparent career management system, based on the pyramid-like model of ranks system, matching positions with ranks, recruitment and selection (Selection Boards), a new ratio between active duty commissioned officers and NCOs.

As stated in a review of Romania's defense recently published by the Ministry of Defense, "Building a professional military is a multilateral process fully integrated in the general restructuring and modernization of the Romanian Armed Forces," while the on-going goals of the Romanian armed forces is "To shape a flexible and efficient professional force, based on voluntary contract enlisted personnel."[189]

A key piece of legislation on achieving the full professionalization of the Romanian Armed Forces, which includes provisions regarding the military personnel and their career path, rights and obligations, or sanctions is the Law 80/1995 on the professional statute of military personnel.

One of the reasons for the difficulties encountered in reforming the human resource management system is that it represents both "an instrument and a vehicle for reforms," as pointed out by Maior and Huluban.[190] Following the argument of Anthony Forster in his paper presented at a workshop organized by Geneva Centre for the

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[189] See the brochure "Romanian Defense". Romanian MoD, Public Relations Directorate, (Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2006), 10-1.

[190] See G. C. Maior and S. Huluban. "From Hardware to Software Reforms in Romania's Civil-Military Relations. The Policies of Personnel Management", *Baltic Defence* Review No.8. Vol. 2 (2002), 103.

Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2000,[191] Maior and Huluban emphasize the similitude between "hardware versus software" reforms and their timeframe. Thus, if the first generation reforms address basic institutional issues, and the attached issues (drafting and approval of basic constitutional and legislative framework, structures and the allocation of clear lines of responsibility), the on-going reform process is focused on long-term arrangements to empower principles of good governance, organizational effectiveness and efficiency – meaning the functioning and performance-related goals of the defense institution, procedures and change in attitudes. In this context, they underline the transition made by the Romanian MoD from an 'empirical' approach to Ministry of Defense personnel administration during the early 1990s, to a scientific approach towards a modern system of human resources management.[192]

To support their argument, the authors draw on the concrete effort made by Romania on its way to NATO membership. Thus, in February 2001, on the occasion of a "profound and pragmatic review of the national accession plan, they observed that three out of the twelve priorities (Partnership Goals – PGs) considered vital for re-establishing credibility for NATO candidacy were related to human resources management and professional soldiers' career paths. The Military Career Guide, enacted since 2001 and the implementation of the Selection Boards for officer's promotions in higher ranks were seen as decisive in Romania's defense reform.[193]

Improving civilian management was also considered among the priorities of human resources management reforms, and both quantitative and qualitative objectives have been set up in this respect, by the newly established Human Resource Management Directorate in 1997.

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[191] Anthony Forster. "Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform: West Looking East." Paper presented at the Workshop on Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform, the 4th International Security Forum (ISF), organized by Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, November 14-17, 2000.

[192] G. C. Maior and S. Huluban. "From Hardware to Software Reforms in Romania's Civil-Military Relations. The Policies of Personnel Management," *Baltic Defence* Review No.8. Vol. 2 (2002), 107.

[193] Ibid., 115, 119.

In terms of gross figures, the civilian corps employed by the Romanian Ministry of Defense, including the three categories of forces and the General Staff, faced a dramatic reduction, from some 40,000 civilians in 1989, mainly employed in administrative and support activities, to approximately 17,000 in 2006. A further reduction is envisaged, to reach the Objective Force of 15,000 by the end of 2007.

But even more radical changes have been implemented in terms of qualitative restructuring of civilian personnel, based on the guiding principle stated in 1998, and approved by the MoD leadership, according to which

> Any job from within the MoD that could be performed by a civilian will be occupied by a civilian. Thus, civilians will be the experts, advisers, highly qualified administrative officers in all defense activities that do not necessarily require military training and experience, or the managers of such structures.[194]

On this basis, apart from the four civilians who are political appointees (the minister of defense, and the three state secretaries and chiefs running the defense departments – Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Legislative Harmonization, Public Relations and the Relation with Parliament and the Procurement Department), there are currently some 300 managers within the Romanian Ministry of Defense and its agencies, and the recruitment of civil servants and defense contractors with high academic qualifications and relevant work experience to occupy leadership and counseling posts is further encouraged.

Some of the advantages of their employment by the military organization can be summarized as follows: a) civilian experts and leaders bring a different perspective – a more managerial approach; b) if used in those fields of expertise that do not require military training and experience, they can be a more efficient, effective and competitive workforce; c) they are cheaper to employ in comparison with their military counterparts, as they have a pay band similar to their military colleagues (while the MoD does not invest in their training and equipment); and d) the costs associated with their potential

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[194] *Overview on the Human Resource Management in the Romanian Ministry of Defense.* (Bucharest Romanian Ministry of National Defense, Human Resource Management Directorate, 1998).

restructuring/downsizing is smaller compared to the active social measures of protection and compensation package paid to the military personnel.

As regards the continuous efforts to improve civil-military relations, Larry Watts recommends focusing on the relationship between civilian leaders (both politically appointed and defense managers) and military commanders, and this relationship should be based on "civil-military discussion, collaboration, and consensus-building," all of them achievable through joint task-forces and common training programs, as most of those provided by Western assistance.[195]

3.   Modernization of Military Equipment and the Defense Procurement Reforms

The defense procurement for the Romanian Armed Forces is carried out by the Procurement/Acquisition Department, run by a civilian-appointed State Secretary. However, major procurement programs are approved by the CSAT. These focus on three major aims, as follows: "the modernization of the existing weapons-systems and military equipment according to NATO standards," "the acquisition of some categories of weaponry which are either non-existent or not efficient," and "the acquisition of Romanian-made weapons systems and the assimilation of foreign technology for their production," as Ioan Mircea Pascu claims. [196]

Taking into account that the principal tasks of military acquisition and property management (APM)[197] are "to acquire, invest in, and manage the critical equipment, weapons systems and technologies necessary for current needs and future operations," due to the economic constraints the modernization of equipment and procurement was always delayed during the first generation of defense reform, while "APM reform was

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[195] Larry Watts "Reforming Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control." *Journal of Political & Military Sociology* Vol. 30 no. 1 (Summer 2002), 53.

[196] Ioan Mircea Pascu. "Defense Planning in Emerging Democracies: the Case of Romania", In: *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe; Guarding the Guards. One Europe Or Several*? (Eds.) Cottey et al., (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001, 136-7.

[197] Concept proposed by Larry Watts "Chapter 2 - Stressed and strained civil-military relations in Romania, but successfully reforming" In: Hans Born et al. *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change*. New York: Routledge, 2006. pp 21-34

central to NATO integration because effective joint operations require standardized and interoperable military technologies." Beyond bringing about other inter-dependent sectorial reforms, among which institutional capacity-building, integrated planning and budgeting, or democratic control, the procurement reforms in the Romanian MOD always posed serious challenges to the civilian and military leaders. This is because, as Larry Watts has put it, "Although procurement and supply plays such a major role in the modernization and alliance integration process, they rarely constitute early priorities of military reforms because of the immense sums of money involved."[198]

The main modernization programs that the Romanian military is embarked upon focus on communications and information systems, air space management and logistics. An increased focus was placed on implementing the Air Surveillance Operational Centre (ASOC) and the Armed Forces Communications System.

As regards the value added by the ten new members to the strength of the North-Atlantic Alliance – at that moment only candidates to NATO enlargement – the analysis proposed in 2002 by a group of NATO analysts revealed serious critiques regarding the decisions, in 1999, to modernize the Romanian Armed Forces by the acquisition of the American Bell 96 Cobra AH-1 attack helicopters. Decisions to cancel the agreement were eventually made, as a "result of understanding that beyond the symbolic gesture, the costs would be barely supported by the country's budget."[199]

In 2006, a key strategy document was issued regarding the field of procurement. The paper, called "The Endowment Conception with Major Equipment and Systems of the Romanian Military 2006-2025," is in line with the major defense planning and strategy documents in force (such as the Act 473/2004 on Defense Planning, the Defense Planning Directive White Book on Defense, the National Security Strategy, or the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy). Understandably, the Endowment Conception of 2006 is designed to fulfill the Force Goals (FGs) and engagements made in

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[198] Larry Watts, In *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and International Change*. Eds. Hans Born et al., (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21-2.

[199] Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster. "Beyond Prague." *NATO Review* (Autumn 2002), 30-3.

line with Romania's contributions with forces and capabilities to NATO Response Force (NRF), and Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) and the commitments made to the European Union. As stipulated in the document, as much as 85% of the military equipment is currently outdated, as most equipment is manufactured with the technology of the 1970s. Among the short term and medium term objectives stated in 2006 for the following two decades, according to the Concept, there is the development of integrated capabilities to become operational by different categories and services and branches and in different timeframes, including those of reconnaissance, surveillance and control systems of the airspace within the NATINEADS system.[200]

For the purpose of demonstrating the difficulties in major procurement and modernization programs with regard to the issues of democratic control, efficiency and effectiveness, but also with the harsh public scrutiny and oversight they are exposed to, two main examples might prove relevant.

The first case refers to the contract for acquisition of two second-hand multi-role frigates type 22, signed by the Romanian Government and military officials with the British Royal Navy, for the sum of £116 million in late 2004, which raised many concerns regarding the efficiency of this investment. Regarding the costs associated with the modernization of the two frigates for combat and escort capabilities, these represents some EUR 600 million for their technological update at a medium level, and some EUR 30 million annually to keep them functional, according to the assessment of journalists. [201]

A second and more recent debatable decision refers to Romania's negotiations for the acquisition of seven medium-sized transport aircraft, equipped with a complete self-protection system to allow them to carry out inter-theatre missions in all operational scenarios under maximum security conditions. While the Romanian authorities, represented by Ioan Ion, the State Secretary and Chief of the Procurement Department, argue that the offer made by the Italian company ALENIA Aeronautica (seven C-27J

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[200] See "The Endowment Conception with major equipment and systems of the Romanian Military 2006-2025", elaborated by the Procurement Department of the Romanian MoD, http://www.dpa.ro/engleza/documente/Endowmentconception.pdf, (accessed Dec. 2006).

[201] "Seful statului ar putea refuza promulgarea Legii bugetului 2006" [The President could refuse the promulgation of the Law on the state budget for 2006], *Gandul* newspaper, (Nov. 7, 2005).

aircrafts that are worth a total of around EUR 220 million) was the only one that met the technical requirements (as recommended by ROMTEHNICA SA, National Company), there are voices that claim that during the negotiations the competitor (the Spanish company EADS-CASA, that offered its C-295 transport aircraft) was disadvantaged. In the end, the solution adopted by the Romanian Armed Forces appears to be "the worst and the more expensive (as it costs some EUR 12 million more) among the two," as argued by Radu Tudor, a Romanian correspondent to Jane's Defense in Bucharest.[202]

C.   CONCLUSION

Following the evidence presented in the chapter on military reform in a book published in 2002 by the Romanian Ministry of Public Information,[203] some of the characteristics of Romanian military reform throughout the rocky road of transition to democracy can be summarized as follows. First, a continuity of military reforms can be observed: a process that started in 1990 and followed several stages of defense reform – with radical shifts regarding objectives to be attained, enjoyed strong political and public support, despite the painful restructuring it brought about. Second, defense reform was also focused: "the main goal of the Romanian Armed Forces process is to develop a robust, leaner, flexible, NATO interoperable and affordable force that can be easily deployed and sustained in theatre." Among the key areas that were addressed, irrespective of the stage of the reforms, the following are of pivotal importance: force restructuring and readiness, defense planning, human resource management, and the modernization of the armed forces, which included the implementation of systems such as Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) and Air Sovereignty Operations Centre (ASOC). Third, Romania's reforms were results-oriented, which allowed for successful implementation of initiatives designed not only to achieve NATO-membership, seen as a "top priority," but also for overarching objectives to improve the defense efficiency and military effectiveness. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the "aggressive" approach of Romania to achieving the NATO Partnership

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[202] *Jurnalul TVR* [*News* - Romanian TV broadcasting], December 6, 2006, 19.00 hours.

[203] *Romania on its way to NATO*, (Bucharest: Ministry of Public Information, 2002), 51-61.

Goals (PGs) during 2000-2002, when twenty-five PGs were completed, while another 57 PGs were planned for the period 2003-2007, with a clear calendar for each. The progress seen in implementing the PPBS system, and the dramatic changes in human resource management,[204] are only a few of the examples of the achievements that recommend Romania's efforts as a successful example in tackling the challenges raised by defense reform.

Romania's progress with defense reform and civil-military relations can be evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively. In quantitative terms, the Romanian Armed Forces suffered a severe downsizing: with a population of some twenty-three million, Romania renounced a mass army and an over-dimensioned structure of about 300,000 soldiers (with the potential to mobilize up to 900,000), tailored according to the military doctrine of the Cold War era, in favor of a "modern, completely professionalized force structure, more efficient, flexible, deployable and sustainable, having the capability to be engaged in a wide spectrum of missions in a joint manner,"[205] with a strength of some 90,000 (of whom 75,000 active duty, fully professionalized, and 15,000 civilians). With a defense budget of $2.3 billion in 2006, and a target of 2.38% of the GDP to be allocated annually to defense (as promised to the North-Atlantic Alliance during the negotiations for accession in 2004), with more than 2,000 soldiers currently deployed for peace-support operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, Romania successfully participates in NATO and EU operations, ranking seventh among nations participating in the Global War on Terrorism.[206]

As regards the qualitative transformations seen by the security and defense sector, the challenges and changes were even more dramatic. The changes in missions to address the new threats and asymmetric risks, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction are accurately mirrored by the last security and defense documents, such as the White Paper for Security and Defense (2004), the National Security Strategy

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[204] *Romania on its way to NATO*, (Bucharest: Ministry of Public Information, 2002), 55-6.

[205] See *Military Transformation Strategy* of 2006, elaborated by the Romanian General Staff.

[206] See "Romanian Defence" booklet, published by the Romanian MoD Public Relations Directorate, Military Publishing House, available on-line at http://www.mapn.ro/publicatii/Romanian%20defence.pdf, (accessed October 2006).

(2006), the Military Transformation Strategy (2006). Furthermore, as the thesis demonstrates, the steps forward made by the military organization in policy-making and the implementation of reforms regarding the planning and budgeting, the human resource management, or military modernization programs all prove that the external triggers for defense reform have been happily met by internal political willingness and technical efforts made by the MOD and General Staff together to demonstrate Romania's potential as a reliable security and defense provider in the Alliance. The abandonment of the conscription system, in favor of an all-volunteer force, starting with January 2007 is another valid indicator of Romania's commitment to defense reform.[207]

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[207] *Law no. 395 from 16 December 2005 on the delay of compulsory military service in peace time and passing to voluntary based military service.* The Official Gazette of Romania, Part I no. 1155, Bucharest, (Dec. 20, 2005).

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V.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The thesis is an overview of Romania's approach to defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution. Special attention is paid to the dimensions of the civil-military relations trinity, as proposed by Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas in their recent research. The analysis reviews the key objectives of defense reform throughout different stages of transition until today, and inquires how the Romanian policy makers framed and implemented civilian control over the armed forces, as well as the imperatives associated with defense efficiency and military effectiveness.

The first section of the thesis proposes conceptual clarifications regarding theoretical approaches to defense reform and military transformation, as approached by consolidated democracies and patterns followed by the political and military authorities of young democracies that emerged in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the aftermath of the Cold War. Arguably, the roles and missions to be performed by the military bureaucracy and the armed forces in the CEE region faced dramatic changes, given the change of the regime, and the dramatic shifts in the nature of risks and threats to national defense and security in the late 1980s. The profound transformations that occurred in the management of social, political, and administrative affairs of the nations had a profound impact on the military institution and the functions it was asked to perform under the new, democratic circumstances.

A framework of analysis is provided as a guide to civil-military relations. Acknowledging that the majority of studies dedicated to the issue almost exclusively address the themes associated with civilian democratic control over the armed forces, and ignore defense efficiency and military effectiveness, a brief review of the definitions proposed by classics in the science of management appears to be useful. Building on conceptual differences between the terms 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness,' and on relevant scholarly contributions to 'performance management' in military organizations, as addressed by the defense reform initiatives in Western democracies, the thesis proposes a

series of qualitative and quantitative indicators that would further guide the analysis of the progress on the dimensions of civil-military relations.

The following section reviews the legacies of communism regarding civil-military relations (CMR) in the countries of CEE, with particular attention to Romania. The scope of the analysis is to provide a better understanding of the starting point of defense reform and the dramatic challenges facing civilian and military authorities during the early 1990s and after. Given the relevant indicators of democratic civilian control, defense efficiency and military effectiveness that were identified in the previous section, revisiting classical theories of CMR, as proposed by Samuel Huntington and Michael Desch provides a useful basis for applying the conceptual framework to the region. The relationship between the military and society during the communist regime is also addressed, as this deepens our understanding of the circumstances in which the defense reform initiatives of the new democracies of CEE occurred during the early 1990s. The section concludes by drawing on the approach proposed by Chris Donnelly in regards to the ambitious objectives posed by the defense transformation process in the Soviet-style armies of South-Eastern Europe during the early 1990s. The author builds on the challenges facing the defense systems in the region, among which are the massive downsizing and restructuring processes, the professionalization and de-politicization of the armed forces, and the pressures towards increasing defense efficiency and military effectiveness.

All the above prepared the analysis of Romania's defense reform, the case study that is proposed by the thesis in the following section. As the evidence provided by this chapter demonstrates, Romania made consistent progress regarding various aspects of civil-military relations, throughout sixteen years of transition to democracy and defense reform. Both the accession to NATO in 2004 and the recent integration into the European Union in January 2007 are concrete proofs in this respect.

As the assessment demonstrates, on its rocky transition towards good governance, healthy civil-military relations, and the professionalization of the armed forces, Romania took full advantage of various forms of Western assistance. Among these there is the know-how transfer ensured by foreign advisors, training and education opportunities provided by the allies. However, as underlined by the study, the efforts made by national

stakeholders in the design and implementation of defense reform initiatives were decisive in achieving the ambitious objectives of defense reform, under the circumstances of ever shrinking defense budgets.

The sequential approach proposed distinguishes between three generations of defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution.

First, during the early 1990s, which coincides with the first generations of Romania's defense reform, which lasted until the Madrid Summit of 1997, the agenda of security and defense reform focused on regaining the legitimate authority of state institutions, capacity building, downsizing and restructuring of the armed forces, and on setting up and enforcing the legislative framework for democratic civilian control over the armed forces. The de-politicization of the military structures and the inflow of civilian experts in non-combat activities were among the developments that occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War, and such phenomena characterized the majority of the CEE countries, including Romania. During the first generation of reforms the main contributors to defense reform were the financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the IMF and EU-PHARE, and all efforts were targeted towards democratization, institutional capacity-building, public administration reforms and restructuring, starting in the late 1990s. Especially since 2001, Western assistance gained consistency and effectiveness, through the means provided by NATO and the European Union, but also by bilateral assistance programs focusing on defense reform and Romania's interoperability with the allies and accession to the above-mentioned institutions. Either the Western assistance consisted of training opportunities in-country and abroad, advising and know-how transfer in certain fields of expertise that were critical to the accession process (such as integrated planning and budgeting, human resource management and training development), and proved to be crucial for Romania's progress on a rocky path of consolidating democracy.

Gradually, with the second and third generations of defense reform, the 'managerial approach' replaced the excessive emphasis on civilian control over the armed forces. Once the basic democratic principles such as civilian oversight over the military became a matter of routine and new strategies were implemented to enforce the

transparency and accountability of military planning and budgeting system, finding ways to increase the organizational efficiency of the defense institution and military effectiveness came to the forefront of the defense reform initiatives.

Romania's progress with defense reform and civil-military relations can be measured and evaluated using both qualitative and quantitative indicators recommended by the dimensions of civil-military relations, as the detailed analysis proposed by the section dedicated to the case study demonstrates.

To summarize, using a one-to-five grading scale (1 being the minimum, and 5 the maximum), given the proposed framework of analysis, the assessment of the founding principles of democratic civilian control, military effectiveness and defense efficiency, on the one hand, and the progress in the Romanian military organization in particular fields of defense reform since the December 1989 Revolution, on the other, can be summarized as follows.

Table 1.   Brief assessment on the progresses seen by Romanian defense reform

Principles Coordinates	Good governance, democracy	Transparence	Accountability & Oversight	Efficiency & Effectiveness
Institutional Capacity-building: Roles & Missions	5	5	4	3
Reorganization and restructuring	4	4	4	3
Planning & Budgeting (PPBS)	4	3	3	3
HRM policies (career system, promotion, training, civilian mgt.)	5	5	4	5
Equipment modernization (Procurement, Privatization, and Contracting out)	2	4	3	2

However, given the ongoing challenges facing both the young democracies of CEE and more mature and modern military bureaucracies, the process of defense reform and the achievement of full professionalization of the Armed Forces is still far from being accomplished. According to the reform and modernization plans, currently applicable, it is expected that in the near future more focus will be placed on achieving military effectiveness and defense efficiency, and it is expected that this will bring about both a reconsideration of the existing structural and functional arrangements, and massive investments in equipment modernization and procurement.

Following the analysis, one can argue that a different focus has been placed during different generations of defense reform: during the first generation, the accent was put on the "hardware" aspects of reforms, such as severe restructuring, creating the legal framework for reforms, or putting into place mechanisms of civilian control, while lately, ongoing or "software" reforms like full professionalization, interoperability, 'objective force,' modernization and procurement of military equipment, performance management, privatization and contracting-out. The latter require a more sophisticated and difficult approach to defense reform and indicators for measuring military effectiveness and defense efficiency, that are to be found on the defense reform agenda on a medium and long run. These are issues to be considered equally by young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, but also by the Western countries, themselves searching for new approaches to getting the most out of shrinking public money. In this respect, borrowing from the principles and practices that usually guide the management of private organizations, which are business-like and performance-oriented, seems to be an extremely valuable approach.

Drawing on the evidence provided by the analysis and on the lessons learned during successive generations of defense reform, some of the issues to be considered by the Romanian policy-makers who oversee the implementation of on-going defense reform and prepare the agenda of the military transformation for the forthcoming period may be synthesized as follows.

As the major trends in military transformation recommend, finding new ways to achieve more and better outcomes with less resources, be they people, money or

equipment, is essential. Given the increasingly austere budget allocations to defense and security, is it expected that in the years ahead the military organization will be required to embrace business-like approaches to planning and spending public money, and adjust the priorities of defense and security to the resources available. In this respect, applying the principles of performance management when tackling the ambitious objectives of defense reform and military transformation is a must, as the thesis exemplifies.

Achieving the full professionalization of the armed forces is not a stand-alone guarantee for defense efficiency and military effectiveness. Similarly, the democratic control over the military is not an end in itself and it does not preclude the military from performing its functions inefficiently and ineffectively. This is just a part of a dynamic process, that also requires massive 'civilianization' of the non-combat fields in the defense bureaucracy, privatizing defense industries, and contracting out, as all the above bring about substantial cost savings, if done in an effective, accountable and transparent manner.

By making use of various assistance programs available, the long-established democracies that have modern armed forces can contribute substantially to the success of defense reform initiatives on which the countries of CEE are embarked. However, assuming the ownership of defense reform initiatives is essential for the long-term developments in the field. Without a realistic approach to the resources available to achieving the defense priorities, and without convincing effort to be paid by national political and military authorities in implementing the initiatives associated with healthy civil-military relations, all the desiderates of defense reform will remain wonderful paper plans, having no chance of ever being achieved.

To conclude, the Romanian case may be considered successful in regards to defense reform and CMR. As the thesis demonstrates, consistent progress has been made regarding civilian control over the military, improving defense efficiency and military effectiveness. There is still much to be done, and the conditions under which the defense reform initiatives should be achieved are not the most encouraging, as the on-going initiatives aimed at transforming the Romanian Armed Forces reveal. However, taking

into account the latest developments and the standards raised by the interoperability with the NATO allies, and more recent EU membership, there are positive indicators regarding further improvements to CMR in Romania.

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